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Brief and ACCURATE

CONDENSATIONS OF CAREFULLY SELECTED ARTICLES

Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn 1953

THEOLOGY DIGEST

THEOLOGY DIGEST is published for the large number of priests, religious, seminarians, and laity who are interested in present-day theological thought, but who perhaps find it hard to maintain and cultivate this interest. Besides the obvious difficulty that the literature appearing in many different languages is so extensive, there is the further diffculty that many important periodicals are not generally available.

THEOLOGY DIGEST aims to help such readers to keep informed of current problems and developments in theology by presenting a concise sampling of current periodical writings in theology. Articles are selected for their significance, interest, and digestibility, after a thorough examination of most of the theological journals in Europe and America. These articles are carefully translated and condensed so as to represent, accurately and succinctly, the thought and spirit of the original. For readers who wish to consult the originals for the documentation and detailed development necessarily omitted from digests and abstracts, THEOLOGY DIGEST can also serve as a guide to further reading and study.

The digests deal with the various branches of theological learning —Apologetics, Dogmatic Theology, Scripture, Moral Theology and Canon Law, Ascetics, Liturgy, and Church History—with emphasis on the speculative rather than the pastoral aspects of theology.

The opinions expressed in these digests are not necessarily those of the editors.

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THEOLOGY DIGEST is published in the Winter, Spring, and Autumn of each year by St. Mary's College, the School of Divinity of St. Louis University. Subscription price in U. S., Canada, and countries of the Pan-American Union, $2.00. Foreign, $2.25. Single copies, 75 cents. Bulk subscriptions—10 or more—mailed to one address and distributed there, $1.50 per subscription. Foreign, $1.75.

THEOLOGY DIGEST is published with permission of ecclesiastical superiors, and all its contents are copyrighted by St. Mary's College, 1953.

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LIFE IN CHRIST

The greatest action ever performed by man took place on Calvary when the Son of Man offered infinite human homage and reparation to the offended majesty of God. Because this utterly unique event contains all the power of God to renew the face of the earth, Christ on the Cross must always remain the very center of Christian living. This unrepeatable historical action is miraculously brought into the present and is re-presented daily and hourly in every part of the world for all to draw near and to derive from the very substance of the sacrifice new life in Christ. In the Mass we find the realization of Christ's words: "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to myself."

But the sacrifice of Calvary is more than the fountainhead of our new life in Christ. The regenerating influence of the Cross reaches down into every phase of human activity, transforming what would otherwise be merely human life into life that is divine. Life in Christ, however, by no means deranges or destroys human nature and its natural functions. Rather it builds on nature and brings it to perfection. Our life in Christ, for example, demands that we cultivate a sound mind and preserve bodily health. It demands that we be good citizens as well as good Samaritans. When conflicts arise between our life in Christ and the activity proper to human nature, the solution will be found neither in crippling human nature nor in frustrating divine grace, but in a clarification of what is proper to each.

In this issue of THEOLOGY DIGEST we present a selection of articles which consider in one way or another our life in Christ as it comes from the Cross through Mary and reaches down into the many activities and relationships of our human existence. The first group of articles focuses our attention on the role of the Cross in Christian living, on the Mother of divine life and her relation to the Mystical Body of her Son, on the jealous solicitude of God and His Church to lead men in the only true way of divine life.

Then follows a series of articles which treat of our life of faith in Christ: the function of reason in faith, the early teaching of St. Paul on our incorporation into Christ through faith and baptism, the remedy for a languishing faith prescribed by St. Paul for the Hebrews.

A third series of articles takes up some problems which arise as life in Christ begins to penetrate and integrate more and more the whole texture of human living: the social function of property, the relation between the Church and the State, the limits of human experimentation in medicine, scrupulosity in the light of modern psychiatry.

The last article is devoted to a study of the reforms of the Breviary, the public prayer of the Church which ever ascends heavenward as an expression of the life of the Mystical Body of Christ.

The Christian is living to the full his life in Christ only when he can say with St. Paul, "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me."

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CHRIST ON THE CROSS

Otto Semmelroth, S.J.

Always mere foolishness to the Gentiles, the Cross of Christ looms in the foreground of the Christian perspective of reality. In his "Christus Crucifixus," originally appearing in Theologie und Glaube, *41(1951:6), pp. 472-486, Fr. Otto Semmelroth, S.J., professor of dogmatic theology at Frankfurt, essays a development of the theology of the Cross by giving an emphasis to the role of the Incarnation in that theology and suggesting how the chasm of time that separates Calvary from men's crosses today may be bridged.*

The Cross in the Salvific Work of the Historical Christ

Theology has become accustomed to opposing the "mystico-physical" interpretation which the Fathers of the Church give to the Redemption, and the emphasis which later theology places on the "satisfaction" of the Redemption. But the two interpretations cannot be essentially different. Two constitutive elements, each essential, go into the whole that is the redemptive work. When the Word entered into humanity at the Incarnation, God and man were ontologically united. This is the element that is the principal consideration in the patristic tradition. But it is necessarily connected with a second element, which has been developed further in later theology, that is, the subjection of Christ's human will, united to the Word, freely making its offering, and satisfying for sin. The theology of the Cross must recognize the ontological divine-human union in the Incarnation and must look to the Incarnation for an explanation of what happened on the Cross.

At the Incarnation, a human nature was joined hypostatically to the Word, whose very life is an eternal recognition of His being from the Father, an eternal "worship" of the Father, we may say (if we understand all subordination as excluded). Thus it becomes the life task of Christ, whose human nature is capable of its own decision, to carry out and fulfill, but in a visible, human way, the "worship" characteristic of His Trinitarian life. He does this in His everyday submission to the Father's will and in His final decision on the Cross when He surrenders His entire divine-human life into His Father's hands. Here we recognize the primary sacramental significance of the sacrifice of the Cross. In the act of homage and in the obedience of the man Christ to the will of the Father, the eternal, Trinitarian homage of the Son of God becomes visible and translated into human form.

But there is still the question: why is the Cross the climax of the God-man's sacrifice? Christ was to atone for the sin by which man had imprisoned himself in his humanity, forgetful of his obligation to glorify God whose image he is. It was necessary. then, for man to submit to God in a free and loving act of choice. Now when is our service before God most personal, entirely our own, a decision of love coming from our heart? It is when difficulties of an unforeseen and unintelligible character impose themselves as restraints on our otherwise so customary life. It is when we meet a problem that we cannot answer and over which, therefore, we no longer have rational control—when we meet such a problem with the holy "Not my will . . ." of an act of choice that now has its only basis in personal submission to God's majesty. The Cross was in the highest degree this kind of choice.

The Cross in the Mystery of the Church

The Church teaches that in the Mass Christ's sacrifice on the Cross

is made present to us. We are asked to make this sacrifice our own by offering it with Him. It is, therefore, not the historical Christ only but the whole mystical Christ, the Church continuing down through the ages, that offers sacrifice on the Cross. Here is sheerest mystery. It means two things: that the salutary event of Golgotha reaches down to our day; and, likewise, that the Church of our day is somehow assembled and placed at the Cross of Christ.

Perhaps a ray of light can be shed on the mystery. As for the first element, namely, that the salutary event of Golgotha reaches down to our day, it must be remembered that in the Mass, Christ's sacrifice is mysteriously brought into the present—*repraesentatur,* says the Council of Trent—in all its essential elements, i.e., both the invisible, interior sacrificial disposition of Christ and also its manifestation in bodily death.

As for the second element, the Church's quasi-personal acceptance of, and cooperation in Christ's sacrifice must be made manifest. It is in *Mary* that the Church of all ages is assembled and represented at Christ's sacrifice on the Cross. In Mary's consent to His offering, the whole Church's subjective ratification of the Cross becomes visible for each Christian to imitate. Only in the measure that men in the Church bring the "Yes" spoken for them by Mary at the foot of the Cross to subjective realization in their own hearts, does the objective mystery of the sacramental sacrifice become a present reality in the heart of the Church.

The Cross in the Lives of Christ's Members

The Cross stands in our lives principally where Christ has placed it—in the sacrifice of the Mass. There we must bring our burdens of everyday drudgery to Christ's altar, there say our "Yes" to them, and receive from Him the assurance that they are not without meaning.

Then the Mass becomes not just an objective, sacramental sharing of a sacrifice which is offered properly only by Christ, but a program that gives meaning to our everyday lives. Everything painful, meaningless, and inscrutable that harasses and threatens our lives, and crushes the lives of so many,—all that becomes a participation in Christ's Cross, rediscovered in the suffering of our daily lives; for we abide in the Body of Christ.

Here two questions come up. First, *why* does our Lord put the Cross and suffering with all its inscrutability into our lives? Second, *how* shall we offer this cross of ours as our share in Christ's Cross so that our position before the altar at Mass is truly expressive of our interior attitude and not just a sham?

The first question is suggested by the very order which God has established. Man's task is to bring to perfection the image of God that he bears in his person. Sin disturbs but does not abolish this original design of God. Man's humanity, as an image of God, has an objective relationship to God. What man is in reality he is free to affirm or deny in his heart. If, in his effort to develop his humanity, man freely and consciously affirms the reality, he thereby glorifies God. He can, however, forget that he must make known the glory of his divine archetype, whose excellence he portrays. This is sin. It consists in making the human—which is essentially relative to God—into an absolute.

To expiate the sin that man committed by making himself archetype instead of image, Christ consummated His sacrifice on the Cross. To share in this sacrifice we must join with Christ in compensating for sinful rebellion against the Father by a free and loving "Yes" to the Father's power and glory. His power and glory are visible precisely in the suffering in which we have to recognize Christ's Cross in our life. The cross is an

intrusion of God's power into our self-possession.

And *how* can we truthfully participate in Christ's Cross? We must remember that just as Christ redeemed our humanity in His sacrifice, so we must accept His Cross into our life if we are to have our own human existence redeemed. The essential attitude is vividly expressed in the person of Mary. If subjectively we imitate her "Yes," we can have a true share in the sacrifice objectively offered in the Mass. It is only with the attitude of Mary's *Fiat* that we can meet the Cross that God time and again inserts into our lives as the claim of His sovereign authority.

In conclusion, one more point must be made. Humanity as a whole, and not only individual men, has the duty of developing as a harmonious image of God for God's glory. Individualism and collectivism both spoil this image. Even when man most closely approaches fraternal unity and peace (perhaps through the efforts of a false humanism), he easily forgets that all human peace and progress is worthless except in so far as it makes mankind, for the glory of God, into an image of the Triune God.

The suffering that comes when humanity forgets its orientation to God is the intrusion of God vindicating His rights. Frequently God imposes this suffering on individuals who, to all appearances, have kept their gaze directed towards Him. They are the ones who are capable of bearing the suffering of humanity in a way that means redemption. If these individuals meet their Cross with fullest submission after Mary's example, then their standing by the Cross of Christ can redeem the world around them.

Any picture of man that has been sketched by human caprice and self-glorification, without regard for the divine archetype, will be blotted out by suffering and meaninglessness. Only in the individual who recognizes the full picture can humanity stand before the powerful, loving Will of God and say "Yes." In such a person the one essential feature of the reflection of God remains—the illuminating, transfiguring power of the love that surrounds itself with its "Yes" to the Will of God. Such a "Yes" is the only thing that can make mankind conscious of its essential task of fashioning humanity after the divine archetype for His honor and glory.

" . . . and it is by the power of the Cross that Our Saviour, although He had been constituted the Head of the whole human family in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, exercises fully the office itself as Head in His Church. 'For it was through His triumph on the Cross,' according to the teaching of the Angelic and Common Doctor, 'that He won power and dominion over the gentiles'; by that same victory He increased that immense treasury of graces, which, as He reigns in glory in heaven, He lavishes continuously on His mortal members; it was by His blood shed on the Cross that God's anger was removed, and that all the heavenly gifts, especially the spiritual graces of the New and Eternal Testament, could then flow from the fountains of our Saviour for the salvation of men, of the faithful first of all; it was on the tree of the Cross, finally, that He entered into possession of His Church, that is all the members of His Mystical Body; for they would not have been united to this Mystical Body through the waters of Baptism except by the salutary virtue of the Cross, by which they had been already brought under the complete sway of Christ."

Pius XII, *Mystici Corporis*

The Theology of the "Promise" According to St. Paul

D. M. Stanley, S.J.

Verbum Domini, 30(1952:3), pp. 129-142.

By the word "Promise," St. Paul means the sum total of all the blessings and graces which were promised to man by God and which are now shown to have been fulfilled in the death and resurrection of Christ. The Promise was made to Abraham and his *seed* (sing.), who is Christ. The children of the Promise are not all the sons of Abraham, nor of Jacob, but the spiritual children only: those who believed with the faith of Abraham and Jacob. Abraham and his spiritual children were "heirs according to the Promise" because they believed in God as One who is able to do what He promises, as the One who raises from the dead (Rom. 4:17). Thus the faith of Abraham is basically the same as our faith, having the same object, the risen Messiah. We are "heirs according to the Promise" because of our union with the risen Christ, who is the fulfillment of the Promise. The mystery of God's predilection is at the core of the theology of the Promise.

The promise of the Father is fulfilled in the resurrection of Christ, and in Christ this fulfillment is perfect; in the Christian, however, the fulfillment of the Promise is only gradual. We have the "Justice of God" if we possess the messianic good in this life, and our salvation is the complete possession of the messianic good in the future life, in the resurrection of our bodies, which is the final fulfillment of our part in the Promise.

The Old Law, the law of observance, circumcision, and fear, was not the Promise but was like a pedagogue, leading men to the great teacher, Christ. The New Law, the Gospel of faith and love, is the Gospel of the Promise, bringing justification, because it fulfills the Promise made to Abraham which is brought about in Christ by His two-fold redemptive act: His death and resurrection.

From the fulfillment of the Promise, many attributes of God the Father are made manifest: love, faithfulness, power, and mercy. And the Promise, of which God the Father is the Author, is now fulfilled in His Son, Jesus Christ. Final judgment will be made according to the norms of the fulfilled Promise, the Gospel of the New Testament, the Gospel of the Risen Christ.



SUBJECTS TO BE TREATED IN FUTURE ISSUES

Christ and the Modern Mind
On St. Joseph in the Liturgy
A Christian Evaluation of Work
Situational Ethics
Devotion to the Sacred Heart and the Council of Chalcedon
The Christian: Disciple of Christ
The Covenant in the Old Testament
A New Approach to Moral Theology
The Social Character of the Church
The Origin of Man and *Humani Generis*
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The Relation between Sin and Death
The Mystical Body: Central Fact in History

The Hour of Jesus and the Hour of His Mother (*John 2:4*)

Juan Leal, S.J.

This article originally appeared in Estudios Eclesiáticos, *26(June, 1952), pp. 147-168.*

I. Historical Introduction

In the past sixty years approximately twenty independent interpretations have been proposed to explain the response of Our Lord to His Mother at the wedding of Cana.

Most interpreters have taken the word "woman" to mean the respectful title of "lady." They say that the first part of Our Lord's response, "What is that to me and to thee?" contains a denial of the favor. The second part, "My hour has not yet come," they interpret as the hour for Him to work miracles.

According to another interpretation Jesus calls Mary "woman" because He wishes to prescind from her quality as His Mother. When He says, "What is this to me and to thee?" Jesus wishes to show that during his public ministry He does not recognize the filial dependence which binds Him to His Mother. He then adds, "My hour has not yet come." The "hour" of Jesus is not the time for working miracles, but the time of His death and glorification. When that hour comes, Mary will be given the role of universal spiritual motherhood with the words, "Woman, behold thy son." During His public ministry Jesus' sole rule of life is the will of His Father. If He grants her request at Cana, it is only because He sees in it the will of the Father, and not because of the flesh and blood bonds which unite Him to His Mother.

This latter interpretation undoubtedly gives the most satisfactory explanation of the close union between Jesus and Mary. If it could also be established exegetically, it is the best interpretation. The hour of Jesus, which would be the hour of gathering the fruits of His passion and death, would be also the hour of His Mother, the hour when she intervenes more directly in the salvation of mankind.

II. Tradition

Though this interpretation has comparatively few proponents in modern times, it is by no means a new interpretation. St. Augustine was the first to interpret the passage this way. In his commentary on St. John he says, "His Mother therefore wanted a miracle; but He, as it were, did not recognize flesh and blood, as He was about to perform a divine work. It was as if He said, 'That which works a miracle, Thou didst not bear. Thou didst not bear My divinity. But because thou didst bear My infirmity I shall recognize thee when My infirmity is suspended on the cross'; for this is what He meant by 'My hour has not yet come!'"

There were others in succeeding centuries who followed St. Augustine's interpretation. St. Thomas himself repeats the words of Augustine.

III. The Remote Context

This interpretation of St. Augustine, and in modern times that of Fr. Gächter and Fr. Braun, is the one which I accept. It contains two principal ideas: 1. Jesus affirms at Cana His flesh-and-blood independence in the work of salvation; 2. His words contain a veiled expression of the grand role which Mary will play in the new Kingdom, once the redemption is accomplished.

1. The Messianic Independence of Jesus

This idea of Jesus working for His Father alone is brought out repeatedly by St. John in general terms —He is sent by the Father, His works are the works of the Father, His words are the words of the Father. But the Synoptics recount instances where Jesus expresses His messianic independence while He is talking to His Mother.

When He was found in the temple, His mysterious reply to His Mother conveys this idea of His independence in doing the will of His Father (Luke 2:49). When He was told that His Mother and His brethren were seeking Him, He shows His independence of flesh and blood. "Who is my Mother and who are my brethren? And stretching forth his hand towards his disciples, He said: Behold my mother and my brethren. For whosoever shall do the will of my Father, that is in heaven, he is my brother, and sister, and mother" Matt. 12:48-50).

In St. Luke, when a woman from the crowd praised His Mother, He answered in the same manner: "Yea rather, blessed are they who hear the word of God and keep it" (Luke 11:28).

Jesus, therefore, repeatedly reaffirms His dependence solely on the will of His Father in His public ministry.

2. The Hour of Jesus

The word "hour" occurs twenty-six times in the Fourth Gospel. In only eight cases is it used in the material sense, as a division of time. In all the other cases it means a transcendent time which has a special religious meaning. In this latter sense, "hour" refers to the death of Jesus, His glorification, and His return to His Father. When, for example, St. John begins to narrate the account of His passion, he says (John 13:1): "Before the festival day of the Pasch, Jesus knowing that *His hour* was come—that he should *pass out of this world to the Father . . .*" In the fourth chapter, we are told that this hour is approaching; in the thirteenth, that it has arrived. The evidence indicates, then, that the hour of Jesus was rather the hour of His death and glorification. Those who claim that the "hour" spoken of at Cana means the hour of His miracles must admit that it would be the only case in the whole Gospel of St. John where it would have that meaning.

3. The Hour of Calvary

The reply which Jesus gives His Mother at Cana gives us to understand that His relations with her will undergo a change when His hour arrives. It is the same evangelist who recounts both scenes. At Cana, Mary assumes her role as Mother, but Jesus seems to cut short her maternal activity. On Calvary, however, when He says, "Woman, behold thy Son," He opens up the way He had closed at Cana. Now that His hour has arrived, Jesus and His disciples enter into a new relationship with Mary. Thus, Calvary throws light on the scene at Cana.

IV. The Text and Its Immediate Contents

1. "Woman, what is that to me and to thee?"

A study of the text itself confirms our interpretation. Most of the commentators generally agree that the reply of Our Lord contains a refusal. The problem is *what* He refuses. According to most interpreters, He refuses a miracle. But it seems to be a contradiction to refuse a miracle, and to go ahead and work it right away. It seems better to distinguish Mary's state of mind, and the petition she made. Her *state of mind* was to help the wedded couple with a miracle, something that pertained to the messianic order, as a revelation of her

Son. Her *petition* was to remedy the the temporal need of the spouses with an extraordinary means. The refusal of Jesus refers to Mary's *state of mind,* not to what she asks. Jesus denies that it pertains to her to direct His messianic activity—this belongs to the Father alone. It is an implicit affirmation that the will of His Father is the norm of His activity. Jesus will work the miracle, but only because He has seen in it the will of His heavenly Father.

A careful examination of Jesus' own words leads us to the same conclusion. First of all, there is a negation implied in the interrogative pronoun "what." The answer implied both by the immediate context and by other uses in Scripture of this same phrase is, "nothing."

If we examine the pronouns themselves, the expression *"to me"* should be taken in the light of other personal references of Jesus to Himself in the Fourth Gospel. Such references indicate the consciousness Jesus had of His divine mission. Similarly here, the opposition between "me" and "thee" can only be explained by that consciousness of His divine mission. The content of the pronoun *"to thee"* is explained by the vocative which is joined to it, "woman." This demonstrates the enormous distance which separates the Word Incarnate in His messianic mission and the "woman" who is His Mother.

2. "My hour is not yet come."

These words can be explained best by taking "hour" in the sense of the transcendent hour of Jesus, the meaning which it has in the rest of the Gospel.

If the hour of Jesus means the hour for His miracles, then the reason He gives His Mother would not seem very strong, since He begins to perform miracles not many days afterwards, at the first Pasch. Again, the use of the words "not yet" imply that when His hour does come, the bonds which bind Him to His Mother will experience a change. Nevertheless, we see the same reserve even after the time for His miracles has come. Furthermore, the use of the definite article with "hour" (literally: *the hour of me*) seems to indicate a definite time, which can best be understood as the climax of His life, when He goes to His Father. Also the pronoun *"my"* seems to indicate a personal intimate connection of the hour with Jesus, such as His hour of glorification would have.

V. The Mariological Content

If we can arrive at the intention which guided St. John's selection of certain details and omission of others in the account of the miracle, we can more easily arrive at the correct interpretation of this passage.

In narrating this miracle St. John had, first of all, an apologetic aim. He tells us explicitly that it manifested Christ's glory and confirmed the faith of the disciples. But St. John wished also to manifest Mary's glory. He described in detail Mary's activity: she notes the failure of the wine, calls Jesus' attention to the fact, and gives the servants their orders. Hence, a fundamental principle of exegesis: that interpretation is more in accord with St. John's intention which, while being confirmed to the text itself, gives Mary greater glory.

Let us apply this principle to the two opinions. According to those who maintain that the hour of Jesus is the hour for His miracles, Mary's glory would consist in having moved up that hour, or at least in having obtained an exception to God's general plan. But it appears something of an anomaly for Mary to ask for and gain what lies outside the general plan of the Father.

On the other hand, if we take the hour of Jesus as the hour of His glorification, Mary's glory is enhanced, because she does not ask or

obtain anything outside of God's general divine economy. Jesus does not refuse her petition, but only affirms that during His public ministry His messianic activity cannot depend on her.

The mariological importance of the first interpretation stops here—just where the beautiful mariological implications of the second begin. In our exegesis, the reply of Our Lord contains a veiled prophecy of the role that Mary will have in the economy of the redemption. This prophecy is suggested in the words, "My hour is not yet come." This seems to indicate that when His hour does come, Mary will enter into a closer relationship with her Son. It will be the hour of His glorification and the hour of applying His merits.

It is significant that St. John mentions Mary as being present on only two occasions, at Cana and at Calvary. The two are intimately connected.

Along with the careful narration of historical detail, there is an element of symbolism in the miracles which St. John describes. The cure of the blind man symbolizes that Jesus is the light of men; the raising of Lazarus symbolizes that Jesus is the life and the resurrection of men. At Cana, the historical reality of changing water into wine symbolizes the transformation that Jesus will work in the world. The intervention of Mary in this miracle symbolizes the maternal influence she will have in this redemptive transformation. St. John indicates the realization of this symbol when he mentions that he, in the name of all, takes for his own mother the Mother of Jesus.

VI. Mariological Conclusion

The hour, therefore, which Jesus alluded to at Cana, was the hour of His glorification. While He was on earth, Jesus Himself, guided solely by the will of His Father, watched over the faithful. But now that His hour has arrived, He confides the faithful to Mary. She will carry on in the same way as she did at Cana—manifesting the glory of her Son and confirming the faith of His disciples. The hour of Jesus is really the hour of His Mother too. It is then that she assumes her role as Mother of all the faithful.

There are three elements essential to the hour of Jesus: it is the time when the Father would be known, the Son glorified, and the Holy Spirit poured forth into all hearts. This is the moment at which Mary takes up her role of universal Motherhood.

"And as through a virgin who did not obey, man was smitten and fell and died, so through the Virgin who was obedient to the word of God, by the life that sprang up, life was again brought forth in man. The Lord came again to see the lost sheep and the lost sheep was man. Therefore, He was not made any other creature but the one who descended from Adam, keeping the likeness of the first creation. For it was fitting and even necessary that in creating a new headship for Adam in Christ, mortality should be swallowed up in immortality; and in renewing Eve in Mary, that, a virgin being intercessor for a virgin, the disobedience of a virgin should be destroyed by the obedience of the Virgin."

St. Iranaeus, *The Proof of the Apostolic Preaching*, chap. 33.

THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MARIOLOGY

Dr. Alois Müller

There is a wealth of mariological literature in current theological journals. The thought-provoking hypothesis advanced by Dr. Müller in this article presupposes the results of his patristic study entitled Ecclesia-Maria: Die Einheit Marias und der Kirche *(Fribourg, 1951). The author admits that his conclusions are by no means definitive, but he feels that the importance of the ideas found in the writings of the Fathers demands a re-examination and re-explanation of the mariological principles. The closely-knit orgumentation, made more compact by digest form, does not lend itself to easy reading. But the editors of* THEOLOGY DIGEST *feel that its readers, though they may disagree with the new first principle proposed by Dr. Müller, cannot but be impressed by its vitality. This article originally appeared in* Divus Thomas *(Freiburg), 29(December, 1951), pp. 385-401.*

In this article I would like to investigate one of the conclusions that follows from my patristic study, *Ecclesia-Maria:* namely that Mary is the archetype of the Church. For the mystery of the Church is the mystery of Mary; and the mystery of Mary is the mystery of man's salvation and the union with Himself which God bestows on His creatures. Hitherto most theologians have declared that the divine motherhood is the basic principle of mariology. I prefer to consider grace as that basic principle, even though in the past grace has generally ranked as something beneath Mary's maternal dignity and following from it. To explain my departure from the traditional position I must explain the relationship between the fullness of grace and the divine motherhood.

Three Opinions

In current mariological thought three basic principles are in evidence. Scheeben holds Mary's Motherhood —closely connected with her role as Bride—as a fundamental. According to Feckes' interpretation of this position, these two apparently disparate ideas are joined in Mary because they are mutually connected in one divine idea: Mary is Mother *because* she is Bride, for her first cooperative act as Bride was to consent to motherhood. Likewise, Mary is Bride *because* she is Mother, for in her mission as Mother she constantly showed the bridal characteristic of submission.

Like Scheeben, Roschini seeks to unite the two ideas of mother and cooperator in the one principle of *universal* motherhood: Mary is both Mother of God and Mother of men. Since "Mother of men" includes the notion of cooperation in the redemption, Mary's dual mission is summed up in the word *maternity.*

Semmelroth, however, takes a new approach. Mary is the Mother of God, but *why?* Mariology can offer an explanation. According to ancient tradition Mary is the archetype of the Church, and mariology is concerned with Mary in so far as she is connected with the drama of salvation. This drama embraces "the whole Christ—Christ with his Church," for the Church as Christ's Bride "makes His work her own and receives from Him the fruits of this work in the fullness of grace . . . which she then

distributes to the individual members." Mary became the archetype of the Church when she became co-redemptrix and, like the Church, received from Christ the fullness of grace for the work of redemption. Furthermore, Mary is like the Church in that she mediates to all creation the fullness of grace which she received. This opinion of Semmelroth, based on the Fathers, seems to be in complete accord with my thesis.

The Fathers of the Church

Let us review briefly what the Fathers hold as fundamental principles in mariology:

1. All agree that Mary's decisive redemptive action was consent to the divine maternity, an action which combined her faith in God and her obedience to Him.

2. By this action Mary prepared the way for the Church. The mystical realists (Irenaeus and Hippolytus) saw in the birth of Jesus the rebirth of all redeemed mankind. Thus the womb of Mary in giving birth to Christ was also the womb of the Church, which gives birth to the nations in baptism, the sacrament "that regenerates men unto God." From the beginning, then, the Church was spoken of as the Divine Mother.

3. What was first said of the Church is applied, especially by the Alexandrians, to each individual man, in whose heart Christ is conceived through the faithful hearing of the word, and is born through baptism.

4. Thus Mary and the Church coincide in their union with God through grace which leads to the divine motherhood. In Mary and in each individual Christian too this mystery of giving birth to Christ is fulfilled under the same condition: preparing by faith for the Word of God. This similarity is founded on the real unity of Christ with His Mystical Body, so that Mary's motherhood and the motherhood of the Church are reduced purely and simply to the mystery of grace, the mystery of man's salvation.

From this the Fathers conclude that Mary's divine Motherhood and espousals should not be conceived as prior to, but as really identical with the Church's divine motherhood and espousals. When we say that Mary is the Church's complete, all-embracing, absolute consummation, we understand the Church in its most general and primary aspect—as submitting to God and receiving grace from Him through Christ. And so we have the basic mariological principle which we first received from the mouth of an angel: Mary is simply the *one full of grace*. Here we stand at the beginning of the whole theology of salvation. All that we know of grace and of the Church has its perfect form in Mary, just as whatever we know of Mary finds a correlative in the Church and in the life of grace.

Critique of the Three Opinions

Roschini's solution, while impressive for its unity, is withal lacking in strict theological coherence. Semmelroth reduces Scheeben's thought in stricter consequence to the Church itself. But we part company with him when he takes the Church not in its ultimate essence, justification, but in its property as mediator of salvation. In all three solutions there is expressed a characteristic of current mariology, namely, the tendency to make Mary a completely independent factor in the theory of salvation. Soteriology would have as its poles Christ and Mary, the Church and grace; it would be essentially Christo-mariological. Something internal and essential would be lacking to the theology of salvation, if it said something merely of Christ, the Church and grace, but nothing of Mary's personal individual co-redemption and co-mediatorship. This autonomizing of Mary's role has permitted authors to

set up Mary's status as divine Mother and Helpmate as a first, irreducible principle; for Mary is such in herself, so constituted solely by God's autocratic decree. But, is "Motherhood" a basic theological concept with which one could win for Mary a place in theology? It seems rather to have its sole function and application in Mary herself.

We are not saying that there is anything false or censurable here. In all likelihood we are simply confronted with the latest fruits of individualism in theology. If Mary actually plays this individual, independent, and autonomous role in the theology of redemption, there is the serious difficulty that it is only recently that she has been recognized in *this* role.

If, however, Mary is not isolated in this fashion, if, on the contrary, she is placed in the midst of the family of the exiled children of Eve, she is seen simply as the perfect Church, the "Full of Grace," then the glance of the theologian will not rest upon Mary merely as an individual person, and something essential will not be missing from theology. For, the best mariology is achieved when our teachings on the Church and on grace are well-grounded and well-constructed. Then, and only then, are the scanty words of the Bible and the ancient Fathers sufficient for building a rich, glorious mariology, particularly since these words without exception point out precisely this road: to see Mary as the Church.

To be sure, Mary is also completely singular. But to elevate this singularity into a methodological principle seems to us ill-advised. For Mary's uniqueness consists in the fact that she universally typifies everything in which the members of the Church constantly and progressively participate—which leads immediately to the central problem of the relation between grace and divine maternity.

If Mary and the Church are equal in divine maternity, and if all this ultimately rests on the fullness of grace, then we are forced to the conclusion that Mary's physical maternity is the immediate consequence, perhaps even a sort of formal effect, of her perfect fullness of grace. We must note that in this we assert something which theologians commonly contradict, since they explain Mary's fullness of grace as the first necessary consequence of her predestination to motherhood, in the same way as the created grace of Christ is the consequence of the hypostatic union.

In comparing our opinion with Scheeben's exposition, it becomes evident to us that while Scheeben was anxious to demonstrate the specific difference between Mary's grace of maternity and sanctifying grace, still so many similarities and connections forced themselves upon him that his expression became incoherent and occasionally self-contradictory.[1] In any case the manifold attempts by Scheeben himself will encourage us to seek a unifying solution, though these investigations are of a tentative and hypothetical character.

Mary's *Fiat* and the Christian's Act of Faith

God has one plan of salvation: to unite human nature with Himself in the Son and to divinize mankind through a mysterious *participation* of men in this union, so that for the whole of mankind "salvation" means a supernatural-physical participation in the Incarnation, in Christ. This participation takes place (1) by the free decision of man, (2) who surrenders himself to God as a bride to her husband, (3) on the basis of faith and in the sacrament of baptism. Seen in this light, Mary's *Fiat* is compared by the Fathers to the act of faith of every Christian, and the birth of the natural body of Christ is compared

1—Dr. Müller's quotations from Scheeben have been omitted here. The digest gives merely Müller's conclusions.

to the birth of the mystical Christ through and in each Christian.

If we hypothetically affirm that sanctifying grace effected the divine maternity in Mary, the question immediately arises: Is Mary's dignity as the Mother of God different only in degree and not specifically from that of every Christian?

We might distinguish a double element in grace. In its formal element we designate grace as making-holy, and as such in all Christians it is qualitatively the same. However, in its material element it can be designated as that-which-conforms-to-Christ; that is, it makes us living members of Christ, and this immediately indicates qualitative differentiation of vocation. The qualitative distinction in the material element can indeed condition a quantitative one in the formal element, just as in the body the eye has "more dignity" than the foot. Therefore, Mary's vocation to grace, her vocation to membership is unique; it is the highest possible vocation in the Body of Christ. To it corresponds also the highest measure of God's favor. One can, therefore, not talk as though another Christian, who receives a different vocation as a member, could demand an equality of grace with Mary. In the formal element the difference is only in degree, or "quantitative," but it rests on the qualitative difference of the material element.

Granted that Mary received the most perfect participation in the Incarnation, it must be demonstrated that this is a "grace of the Church," if the mysterious homogeneity of Christ's physical and mystical body and the *meaning of the Incarnation* are not to be endangered. Because grace always essentially connotes "divine maternity," *Mary's* grace is simply the perfect participation of humanity in the Incarnation.

Was Mary's Grace Different from Ours?

Is, therefore, the grace of Mary's maternity the same as, or different from, the maternal grace of every Christian? To make the question more precise: Besides this grace of physical motherhood, did Mary have still another grace which made her, like every Christian, a mystical mother of God? Or is the physical maternity precisely her mystical divine maternity? One thing we must safeguard with the most ancient tradition: Mary's grace, the acme of all ecclesiastical grace, is homogeneous with all other graces. It is essentially singular so far as it is the *perfect* grace, while all other graces in the Church are merely partial graces according to the measure of Christ's beneficence. And between the perfect and the imperfect there is a difference which cannot be called merely one of degree, although it remains within the same essence. To him who stands on the pinnacle of the mountain, that person is nearer whose position is merely a few steps below him than the one who remains at the foot. Nevertheless no one is equal to him who stands on top, while the second and the lowest are alike in this that they are on the way but not at the pinnacle. This distinction might enable us to safeguard Mary's uniqueness without snatching her into the distant stratosphere. We do hold with Scheeben that Mary received the supreme, most perfect participation in Christ. We only go on to maintain that she nevertheless does not form a new order by herself, but is the glory of *our* order.

Immediately this objection is made: Through the divine maternity Mary entered into a relationship with the Word, which entirely surpasses in dignity the order of nature, grace, and glory, and is itself

surpassed only by the hypostatic union.

Our response is twofold: First of all, it was not the purely physical relationship to Christ which formally sanctified Mary, but the spiritual. St. Augustine says: "Mary was more blessed in receiving the faith of Christ than in conceiving the flesh of Christ." Consider also our Lord's words: "Who is my mother and who are my brothers? He who does the will of my Father who is in heaven . . ." We see, therefore, that what constitutes Mary's dignity as mother God is that wherein all Christians can also become similar to her.

Secondly, does not the order of grace have life essentially and exclusively from the hypostatic order, so that one must speak of a transcendental relation between the two? There is not a single proof in ancient tradition for two orders of grace: the order of Mary and the order of men.

Summary and Conclusion

Our hypothesis is proved tenable and is supported by the most ancient tradition: God has only one plan of salvation; He has set up only one order of grace, and this is essentially directed to divine maternity. It is fulfilled where grace is perfect, in Mary. The perfect endowment of grace makes Mary our ideal model, unattainable but not merely different in degree. The idea "fully endowed with grace" is, therefore, at the very foundation of Mary's existence. The divine maternity is the internal fruit, the formal effect of this grace, since the form of every grace has a bridal character.

Our Grace Perfect in Mary

The same grace of mystical divine maternity in which all Christians participate is, therefore, in Mary the perfect and universal grace of the physical divine maternity, thus including the partial motherhood of all Christians. In this, Mary's spiritual motherhood over the Mystical Body is not denied. However, because we are not members of Christ in addition to Christ or next to or outside of Him, but only *in Christ;* so likewise with motherhood in respect to Christ is conjoined motherhood in respect to the entire Church, and that *directly,* as we expressly assert. If Mary and the rest of mankind thus came nearer each other, it is not indeed by derogating the position of Mary, but perhaps by newly dignifying the Christian's state of grace; our entire state of grace is such that its perfect realization connotes "Mary."

Thus should Mary be known, and thus should mariology be constructed. The theology of salvation stands upon two pillars: the theology of the Incarnate Word, and of the participation in Him, the Church. When the nature, the form, and the measure of this participation is to be explained, then must one speak of Mary. For she is the perfect Church, the whole Church, the person supremely participating in the divine-human marriage — the one Full of Grace. Mariology is the concrete illustration given by God, and at the same time the unique perfection and, therefore, the essential crown and completion of the tract on the reception of God's salvation by mankind, which all nations call blessed in Mary.

APPENDIX

The mystery of Mary can be outlined on the basis of the fullness of grace as follows:


Effect of perfect grace in Mary
as sanctifying
in beginning ..... Immaculate Conception ..... (1)
in life ..... Moral impeccability ..... (2)
in death ..... Assumption ..... (3)
as constituting her relation to Christ
in Himself
relation of spouse ..... Perpetual Virginity ..... (4)
relation of mother ..... Physical Divine Maternity ..... (5)
as the Redeemer
in the redemption of mankind ..... Universal Receptive Co-redemption ..... (6)
in membership of the Redeemer ..... Universal Mediation of Grace (7)

Explanation

1. Distinction of the formal and material elements: God's favor and membership in Christ.

   A. The perfect likeness to God has its three specific effects

      1. In the beginning (1)
      2. In the course of life (2)
      3. In the end of earthly existence (3)

   B. The perfect membership in Christ connotes

      1. In relation to Christ and the God-man
         a) perfect marriage (4)
         b) perfect motherhood (5)
      2. In relation to the work of Redemption
         a) the perfect reception of redemption (6)
         b) the subordinate cooperation: transmission of redemption (7)

Mary and the Church

R. Laurentin

La Vie Spirituelle, 86(1952), pp. 295-304.

Ever since the 17th Century the gap separating theology and mariology has widened. While theologians were neglecting the traditional place given to the Blessed Virgin, mariologists were exalting her without reference to the whole of theology. It is a fact of some importance, therefore, that the relationship between Mary and the Church is being given serious study today. True, Scheeben had done some pioneering in this field, but he was given little heed. Within the past several years this question has been treated in a number of historical and theological studies which we wish to review here.

In 1938 Fr. H. Coathalem, S.J., submitted to the Gregorian University a thesis entitled *The Parallelism between the Blessed Virgin and the Church in the Latin Tradition up to the 12th Century*. From an objective study of patristic texts, the author shows that among the Fathers there was a simple comparison between Mary's earthly life and the life of the Church. Another view, emerging triumphant in the 12th Century, developed the *active* role of Mary in relation to the role of the Church, so that the Virgin is put between Christ and His Church.

The war prevented the publication of Fr. Coathalem's thesis. However, the book of Dr. Alois Müller, *Ecclesia-Maria* (Fribourg, 1951) resumed the study. Though he ends his research with the year 431, he extends his study to take in both the Greek and the Latin writers. While the western tradition looked from Mary to the Church, and the eastern from the Church to Mary, St. Augustine deepens and joins the two traditions. In a stimulating conclusion the author isolates what seems to be the very essence of patristic theology on Mary and the Church: "Mary is the complete fulfillment of the Church. The essential mystery of the Church is the mystery of Mary." And this is ultimately the mystery of divine motherhood. To the oneness of the physical and the mystical Christ corresponds a oneness of Mary, the physical mother of Christ, and the Church, the mystical mother of Christians.

Dr. Müller's collection of texts is exhaustive, his analysis is solid and deep. The conclusions, wherein he gives free rein to his genius for synthesis, are rich theologically and spiritually. There is present also an element of artistry, in the good sense of the word, which makes for a decided unity of impression. But we must keep in mind that other orientations could be given to the reading of these texts.

In its 1951 meeting, the French Society of Mariological Studies took up the historical research of the Mary-Church parallelism. The ante-Nicene period was treated by Fr. Holstein, S.J., of the Catholic Institute of Angers, who revealed the great riches of the texts of Ireanaeus and Tertullian, Clement and Origen. Dr. Müller gave a synthesis of the period from Nicea to Ephesus. In a study of the Latin liturgy (7th to the 11th centuries) Dom. G. Frenaud of Solesmes concluded that the Mary-Church relationship, though latent in many texts, is made explicit only in the Mozarabic liturgy. Finally, Fr. Barré, continuing the study from Bede to Albert the Great, reaped an abundant harvest from the texts, considering in turn: (1) Mary, a type of the Church (he notes that the medieval theologians had a live awareness of the difference between the two terms of comparison); (2) the place of Mary in the Church; and (3) a Marian interpretation of the "Church themes."

The introduction to this whole study was given by its inaugurator, Very Rev. Fr. J.-M. Nicolas, O.P., Provincial of Toulouse. He posed the theological problem in all its profundity and fullness without anticipating any conclusions. The parallelism between Mary and the Church is basically a mystery of "the feminine," that is, a mystery of receptivity of the creature in regard to the Creator. Further, in both Mary and the Church there is the paradoxical alliance of the qualities of mother, virgin, and spouse; of original holiness, fullness of grace, and growth of faith; of terrestial co-redemption, heavenly intercession, and resurrection of the body. In all this, Mary as joined to Christ directly and prior to the Church, anticipates the Church.

Another theological synthesis is found in the book of Fr. O. Semmelroth, S.J., entitled *The Archetype of the Church. An Organic Development of the Mystery of* Mary (Würzburg, 1950). The second part of the book corresponds perfectly to the subtitle, for here the author shows how the parallel mysteries of Mary and the Church are organized in a harmonious architecture. In the more original first part of the book, Fr. Semmelroth proposes a new solution to the ever baffling clash that is evident in considering Mary as *mother* and as *associate* of Christ. These two principles, he says, are two aspects of a third and more fundamental one, namely Mary as

archetype of the Church. Does not this reduce the more fundamental principle of divine maternity to the Church which follows upon it? Semmelroth replies that in order of execution this is true, but in the order of intention Mary is willed primarily as the archetype of the Church. The problem, however, remains open.

In conclusion we might point out that this new ecclesiological perspective which has removed mariology from its isolated position is no panacea. It does bring a new light to marian problems; it does not solve them once and for all. We must always be on our guard against substituting a mechanical formula for reference to the living mystery of Mary and the Church.

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The Eucharistic Fast for the Laity.

CIRCUMSTANCES	WHAT IS PERMITTED	TIME LIMIT	PRIEST'S ADVICE
Sickness (1)	Liquids: Medicine	None	Required
Hard Work (2)	Liquids	One Hour	Required
Late A.M. Hour of Communion (3)	Liquids	One Hour	Required
Long Journey (4)	Liquids	One Hour	Required
School Children (5)	Liquids	One Hour	Required
	Regular Meals (6)	Three Hours	Not Required
Evening Mass	Liquids	One Hour	Not Required

1) Patients need not necessarily be confined to bed or house.

2) Such as night duty by hospital personnel, police, watchmen, transport workers; or work by housewives who for a long time must attend to domestic duties before going to Mass.

3) Holy Communion can be received only at a late hour, i.e., after 9 A. M.

4) A mile and a quarter on foot, or fifteen to twenty miles by car in order to reach church.

5) When difficult for them to go to church, return home for breakfast, then go back to school.

6) Beer and wine may be taken at these meals, but no strong drink.

N.B.—WATER NEVER BREAKS THE FAST.

THE JEALOUS GOD

August Brunner, S.J.

The intolerance of doctrinal error on the part of the Church is a subject of frequent misunderstanding by non-Catholics. In this article Fr. Brunner finds in the scriptural notion of the jealous God who alone can save men the meaning and the explanation of the intolerance of the Church, an intolerance not of pride, but of love. This article originally appeared in Stimmen der Zeit, *148 (Sept., 1951), pp. 401-410, under the title, "Der eifersüchtige Gott.*

In many places in the Old Testament God calls Himself "a jealous God" (Ex. 20:5; Deut. 5:9; Ex. 34:14). With jealousy as one of His essential attributes, God cannot but exclude all other gods and claim all religious honor for Himself.

In the New Testament this claim to exclusiveness does not disappear. "He who is not with me is against me; and he who does not gather with me scatters" (Luke 11:23). Christianity claims to be the only true religion, and the Catholic Church teaches that she alone is the true Church and, therefore, that she alone, as Christ's Mystical Body, can efficaciously apply the redemptive work of Christ. All, then, who are saved are saved through the grace of Christ working in and through the Church.

The gods of heathendom knew nothing of such exclusiveness. Demanding only that each diety receive what he had a right to, they let their wrath fall on the man who reserved his honor and love for a single god. Similarly, pagans considered the Christians as atheists and worthy of death for wanting to adore only one God.

Modern Attitude

No less does modern man rebel against the Church's claim to exclusiveness. In his quest for God man needs no intermediary, it is claimed; therefore, no one should try to force another to follow his way. Religious intolerance, which is nothing more than collective jealousy and lust for power, should be rejected along with a jealous God, a single Mediator, and an exclusive Church.

Such sentiments rise precisely from a conviction of the infinite greatness and grandeur of God! What difference does it make to God, we are asked, if man honors his divine Lord under this or that form provided that, in so doing, he tries to unite himself to Him? What counts is uprightness of character and the sincerity of our desires!

As a result of this kind of thinking there has arisen a widespread conviction that no final value should be attached to the various teachings and types of religion, for all alike are an attempt, foredoomed to failure, to give expression to the inexpressible. As a consequence, tolerance is shown to all religions with the exception of Catholicism or Christianity in general, because of its claim to exclusiveness.

Reasons for Pagan Errors

The attitude of the pagans is to be understood in the light of their knowledge of God. Left to their own natural powers, they came to know the divinity in its mysteriousness as so superior to man that they thought it presumptuous to shape it down to

a definite, earthly form. Since the eyes of the pagan world were for the most part turned toward powers superior to man, the divinity was pictured as many-faceted, even as contradictory. Indeed, moral evil itself did not seem incompatible with the ultimate foundation of the world.

A recognition of only one of these forces seemed an exclusion of other equally real forces and a provocation of their wrath. As new mysteries, new divine forces, were always being encountered, the number of the deities grew ever larger. Even when a man had been brought by reasoning to admit that the divinity is one and the same everywhere, or when the believer in a moment of living self-dedication to one deity appears to have recognized and honored this one alone, the individual gods were somehow in the background and taken for granted.

Lack of certainty about the nature of God filled the pagans with anxiety and drove them to multiply their cults so as to be protected on all sides. It was said that the gods, through the equivocal utterances of the oracles, induced man to misdeeds, the consequences of which he had to shoulder by himself. The tolerance, which pagans accorded to every kind of teaching about the divine, followed upon their awareness of their lack of knowledge. Teaching about the divinity was clothed, not in dogma, but in myth.

Is Indifference Progress?

Modern man finds himself in a similar situation as soon as he rejects revelation and seeks to construct his own road to God. No man-made religion can lay claim to complete certainty and freedom from error about the nature of God and the way to Him. Indifference toward the diversity of religious cults has its source in this impotence. It is striking, however, that in modern times man proudly presents this indifference as progressive so that he looks with scorn on the Church with its jealous God. Dogmatic tolerance is esteemed as a mark of good training, and it tends to be confused with practical tolerance.

Christianity, like the religion of the Old Testament, is not based on man's natural religious knowledge. It draws its teaching from revelation, that is, from the self-communication of God. When God tells us who He is and marks out man's way to Him, all human attempts to draw near to Him are by that very fact pushed aside as insufficient. Man's claim, then, to know for himself how to reach God is a claim to know better than God Himself who He is. Should man deny the possibility of revelation, he bases his entire concept of God, and, consequently, his entire religion on an unproved prejudice.

Such a claim, moreover, would fall short of blasphemous nonsense only if it could be established that the divinity is an impersonal force without cognition. As a matter of fact, in the last analysis this is what the pagans thought. Modern religious movements which claim that this concept of God is purer than a belief in a personal God have fallen to a pre-Christian level. Since an impersonal god knows neither himself nor the honor paid to him and cannot show man the way to himself, man must try by his own efforts to discover the way. But such a quest cannot but end in failure.

The Error of Impersonality

Belief in the impersonality of God frequently springs from the desire to evade responsibility. However, it can also happen that correct insights are at the bottom of this, insights from which false conclusions are drawn. All too familiar are we with

the limitations of human personality, which are so closely tied up with it as to seem inseparable from personality itself. The constancy and impartiality we look for in God are hardly to be found among men. However, in the indifference of the impersonal they seem to be perfectly realized. This kind of reasoning leads man to the conclusion that impersonality represents a higher level of reality than personality.

Again, man finds it hard if his love remains shut out from the most intimate mystery of the person he loves. In human relationships an insuperable barrier of estrangement frequently blocks the road to perfect oneness in love. Hence, the fear arises that the union with a personal God will turn out to be no better.

Apart from himself and other men, man encounters only sub-personal objects. Consequently, his efforts to excogitate a supra-personal God frequently tend to end up on a sub-personal level and to reduce God to a force within the world. Such a conclusion is all the harder to avoid because the course of the world, measured from purely human standards, sometimes appears to lack rational direction. For reasons such as this, the pagan world believed that even the gods stood subject to, and powerless before, an impersonal ultimate, a universal law, or an unthinking necessity. Accordingly, man did not consider his own personality as his highest good but turned himself over to the same impersonal world forces as were at work within himself and were deciding his fate.

Such a concept of God and man admits of no understanding of salvation in the proper sense of the word. Personality as thus viewed can represent nothing ultimate, and salvation is a return to the unconscious existence of a stone. There is no difference between this kind of salvation and simple annihilation.

Divine Personality

Only God, whose Spirit searches all the depths of the divinity, is able to tell man who He really is. In revealing the mystery of the Trinity, God has asserted His supra-personality and explained in what it consists. In God the most perfect "in-one-another-ness" of the three Persons through pure love is eternal reality. Any division in the intimacy of this eternal union is impossible; the three Persons are one God; the union is so close because each of the divine Persons is completely Himself and completely God. In the light of this truth we know for certain that the limitations of human personality do not spring from personality as such.

If God is perfect in His personality and, measured against human personality, is supra-personal, the divine exclusiveness becomes understandable. Yes, "jealousy" is inseparable from God's essence because unlimited personal existence is His essence. A stone is tolerant; you can say whatever you please about it, and it is not disturbed. It cannot tell you what it is or how you can reach it. Were God impersonal, He could not be concerned with us and our salvation. Moreover, in the case of a pantheistic god, redemption would have no meaning, for where there is only one, union in love is impossible.

As a person, man is set off in distinction to everything which is not himself, and precisely because of this he is capable of recognizing others and entering into union with them. Of course, as a consequence of original sin, this distinction from others leads to jealousy in the *bad* sense. Anxiety for his own existence brings man to believe that he can survive only by fending off and excluding others. Jealousy, therefore, has two aspects. It means self-seeking. But it also means the personal interest and concern we take in another mortal

whose love stirs us; it means the free self-dedication to him in a free choice.

God's Love Is Jealous

If the tri-personal God desired to make it clear to men that He is the infinite love that gives itself in a personal way to each and every man, the love intensely eager to lead him to salvation, He had the image of "jealousy" with which to express His will. This word also emphasizes the demand for a free return of love. All the more necessary was it to place this personal giving of love in the foreground because the all-embracing extension of this love easily gives rise to the erroneous belief that beyond the visible universe there stands an impersonal force of nature as ultimate cause. The history of religion shows how widespread this error has been.

A God who calls Himself a "jealous" God cannot possibly be an inert force, acting blindly and without knowledge of His works and their consequences. A jealous God means the one God with all the power of His uncreated love.

While human jealousy draws its destructive fire from anxiety about its own existence and from a consciousness of its own powerlessness, divine love streams forth from the unthreatened and the unassailable security of the divine existence. God can stoop to the nothingness of human nature and can empty Himself of His prerogatives and be found as a man for the purpose of leading man to salvation. The true and profound meaning of divine jealousy has been disclosed in the Incarnation. "For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that those who believe in him may not perish but may have life everlasting" (John 3:16). An impersonal deity would be incapable of such love.

It is not, therefore, because of petty jealousy and anxiety about Himself and His own greatness that God excludes strange gods and false religions, but because of His loving zeal for man's salvation. He alone wills to reign as God, not merely because He alone really *is* God, but also because He alone is able to lead man to salvation.

The divine jealousy of which the Old Testament speaks is, then, a gentle intimation of the deepest mystery of God, which primitive man would not have understood if presented in another way. Only in His Son could God clearly reveal the mystery of divine love.

Why the Christian Is Intolerant

Christian intolerance is justified by the intolerance of the true God. Consequently, it must be an intolerance of love, unable to look on silently while others miss salvation, but likewise, in accord with the nobility of true love, respecting the freedom of others. Since human self-seeking is always prone to pervert this true Christian intolerance into self-assertiveness and a desire for the upper hand, the Christian must always examine and purify his zeal. His tolerance, however, does not spring from religious indifference or from inability to reach certitude about God, but from pure love. While never compromising the truth for human reasons, he will keep in mind the ancient teaching of the Church that God does not refuse His grace to the well-intentioned who do what they can. Who these people are only God can say. Thus, the Christian, while remaining fixed in his own belief, can respect every sincere but heterodox belief, because divine love and human dedication are already at work wherever honesty and readiness for sacrifice exist.

THE LIMITS OF THE PROOF FROM SCRIPTURE

John Levie, S.J.

Nouvelle Revue Théologique, 71(December, 1949), pp. 1009-1029.

The author of this article strives to show what the Catholic exegete should try to accomplish in his work. He ends his study, which is rich with illustrations of his main thoughts, with four conclusions, none of which are new but all of which help to bring out the splendor and difficulty of a dogmatic proof from Scripture.

1. Since divine truth has been transmitted to us by men, writing under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, it is only when we have a perfect grasp of the writer's thought and an understanding of the writer himself that we are able to attain to God's thought. I understand God's affirmations as He intends them only if I understand the soul of the inspired writer as perfectly as possible.

2. The norm to be used in gauging the value of the writer's affirmations is this: their importance in the theological synthesis of the writer. The exegete must carry his study to the very center of the writer's thought and interior life whence everything else flows as if naturally. This synthesis, we hasten to add, is to be made in the light of Catholic dogma in its present state of development. Perfectly honest in his historical work, the exegete will carry on his study as a believer, knowing full well that the inspired writer he studies is, after all, only an accredited witness to truths which are far above him as well as above other men.

3. Since this is so, the exegete will look on Scripture as an unchangeable point of departure ever to be returned to, rather than as an end. It is the full growth of Christ in the Church which is the end. It is the Church's task to continue from age to age that movement of thought toward a complete synthesis of revealed truth, which in God's way of teaching was given to the Apostles to be clarified and unified by the Church.

4. Above and beyond all the exegetes, the Church in the thought and life of all the faithful is ever at work on Scripture, joining the thought of Paul to that of John and Peter and subordinating them all to the thought of Christ. This is a valid way of proceeding since the same Holy Spirit has inspired all the writers.

The Church, furthermore, must always reread Scripture in the light of the present. The meaning of the New Testament, becoming ever more clear in the light of doctrinal developments, has in a way a double context: that of the Apostles' time and that of succeeding ages. Possessed of infallibility, the Church draws dogmatic conclusions from Scripture which the exegete cannot show to have been explicitly formulated in the mind of the inspired writer, but which he does see are necessary today if the authentic message of Scripture is to keep its full meaning.

THE EASTER MYSTERY IN THE LIGHT OF APOSTOLIC PREACHING

J. R. Geiselmann, "Das Ostermysterium im Lichte der urapostolischen Verkündigung," *Geist und Leben,* 25(1952:2), pp. 85-98.

A. *The Problem of the Preacher*: What is the practical meaning of Easter? Misleading themes:

1. The resurrection of nature, that of our Lord, our own resurrection. This tends to make the resurrection the poetizing of nature. The resurrection is an *historical fact.*
2. The resurrection of our Lord—the ground of our faith and hope. The resurrection becomes the greatest of miracles; its mysteriousness is isolated.

Both themes fail because they do not rest on the *full* teaching of the New Testament.

B. *The Problem of the Exegete*:

1. How is it that Paul (an Apostle, and, therefore, a *source* of tradition) appeals to tradition (1 Cor. 15:3-5) when preaching the resurrection?
2. And yet how is it that on other occasions (Acts 22:14) he *does* appeal to his own eye-witness?

The Answer:

1. Paul was a witness to the *Gospel* of Christ's resurrection, but
2. he was not a witness to the *mystery* (the full meaning) of that resurrection.

Conclusion: The essence, therefore, of the Easter-Mystery is there to be found where Paul appeals to tradition: "and that He arose again the third day [1st. element], according to the scriptures [3rd element]: And that he was seen by Cephas: and after that by the eleven [2nd element]."
If then Paul appeals to tradition merely because *he* did not see our Lord on the *third* day, these elements must be essential to a full understanding of the Easter-Mystery.

C. *New Testament Teaching and the Resurrection*:

First Element: Christ rose *on the third day.*

The time element assures us that the resurrection is not a poetic myth transposing the recurrent cycle of nature's changes into the destiny of a god, but a fact limited by the restrictions of time.

Second Element: Christ appears to the Apostles.

The Apostles touch, see, and hear our Risen Lord; they are chosen as eye-witnesses to announce the resurrection to mankind. At this stage, then, the fact becomes "historical."

Third Element: Christ arose *according to the Scriptures.*

This assures us that the resurrection belongs to the order of God's divine economy; that God Himself is at work. For God has brought Christ back to life (Acts 2:32) and has caused Him to appear to the chosen witnesses (Acts 10:41). The resurrection marks the fulfillment of the messianic prophecies and is directed to the salvation of mankind (Acts 3:26).

Fourth Element: Christ's resurrection and the sacrament of baptism.

It was for us, says St. Paul, that God fulfilled the promises made to the Patriarchs. Our Lord's resurrection was for our sakes; it is through baptism that the burial and death of Christ are extended to us in their sacramental consummation—hence, Paul looked on baptism as the Easter sacrament. "You, by baptism, have been united with his burial, *united, too, with his resurrection*" (Col. 2:12).

D. *False Meanings of Easter*:

1. *Kierkegaard*: By baptism we become contemporaries of Christ through our sacramental union with him. We are made contemporaneous with Christ.

   However, in such an explanation we deny our own place in history, that is, in that era after the resurrection and before the second coming of Christ.

2. *Casel*: Through baptism, the death and resurrection of Christ become contemporaneous to us. Christ is made contemporaneous to us.

   However, we would thereby deny the fact that the resurrection took place but once, and at a fixed time. So strongly emphasized in apostolic preaching were the uniqueness and unrepeatability of the resurrection that St. Paul, though himself accorded a vision of the Risen Lord, appealed to the testimony of the other Apostles who alone were witnesses of the historicity of the resurrection.

E. *True Meaning of Easter*:

Our burial and rising with Christ is concerned only with the sacramental effect of the resurrection. In baptism we are not made *contemporaneous* to Christ, but *conformed* to Him—a conformation grounded on the fact that Christ, the Risen Lord, is the Head of the Body of which we are the members. The Holy Spirit molds us to Him who died and rose again.

Our resurrection with Christ will be fully realized only with the Second Coming of the Risen Christ. As buried and risen with Christ in baptism, our position in the drama of salvation lies between the resurrection and the second coming.

Resurrection and Redemption

Bruce Vawter, C.M.

The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 15 (Jan., 1953), pp. 11-23.

What is the relation between the reality of the Resurrection of Christ and the state of sin? This is the question that Father Vawter asks. His answer is that the Resurrection is related to spiritual regeneration as cause to effect, and that this doctrine is certainly part of the teaching of St. Paul.

The early Greek Fathers interpreted 1 Cor. 15, 16-17 ("For if the dead rise not again, neither is Christ risen again. And if Christ be not risen again, your faith is vain, for you are yet in your sins.") and Rom. 4, 23-25 (". . . Jesus Christ . . . who was delivered up for our sins, and rose again for our justification") as meaning that the resurrection is, equally with Christ's death, a cause of justification. They were not considering the redemption under the aspect of merit, nor did they distinguish it as "objective" and "subjective"; the functions of the passion and resurrection were not differentiated by them; the two were simply taken as the co-causes of salvation. Thus while their interpretation had the distinct advantage of echoing St. Paul's literal assertion—that the resurrection is *for the purpose* of our justification—at the same time their exegesis is, in our eyes at least, excessively vague; there is no distinction between the role of the resurrection and that of Christ's death, and no definition of the relationship between them. Yet Paul distinguishes, as well as associates the two factors in the texts.

The Latin Fathers, on the other hand, must be given credit for an attempt to achieve an integration, to fit this interpretation and the rest of the doctrine of the redemption into a related theology. But in doing so, they unfortunately tended to weaken the force of the text by minimizing the causality which St. Paul had predicated of the resurrection. They considered this causality merely a moral one, as the resurrection was considered exclusively as a motive of faith, a complement to the passion of Christ. With rare exceptions, the Latin Fathers treated the passion and resurrection no longer as companion causes of the redemption, as had the Greeks. They rather considered the passion as the exclusive cause in the strict sense, while the resurrection was relegated to an accessory after the fact, without any real causality of its own.

But if this was the general rule, the exceptions to the rule are noteworthy. St. Augustine certainly went beyond the Greek Fathers in that he both preserved the causal connection of the resurrection with the redemption, and likewise distinguished the causality of Christ's death and resurrection, and related them. However, it is in St. Thomas that we find the ultimate crystallization of this teaching in an exegesis which perfectly weds the obvious sense of St. Paul's concept to the corpus of the theology of the schools.

The resurrection is an efficient cause of its salutary effects. It is indeed the model of what it produces—but its causality is based on man's incorporation into Christ's body. Christ's resurrection is thus the cause of our own, not by merit, nor as an exemplary cause alone, but as an instrumental, efficient, and exemplary cause used by God, the principal cause.

"Here, again, we have further proof that private ownership is in accordance with the law of nature. For all that is required for the preservation of life, and for life's well-being, is indeed produced in great abundance from the soil, but not until man has brought it into cultivation and expended upon it his solicitude and skill. Now, when man thus spends the activity of his mind and the strength of his body in procuring the fruits of Nature, by such an act he makes his own that portion of Nature's field which he cultivates—that portion on which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his individuality; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his very own, and have a right to hold it without anyone being justified in violating that right."

Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*

Baptism *In The Epistle To The Galatians*

Augustin Grail, O.P.

The characteristic theme of St. Paul's teaching is his comprehensive vision of God's providence for humanity, with Jesus Christ as its beginning, middle, and end. Everything is fitted within this framework. Fr. Grail shows how this answers the problem of the Galatians and how the Apostle vindicates the Gospel against legalism by demonstrating that salvation is had by faith in Christ and by union with Christ, which is the immediate effect of baptism. This article appeared in Revue Biblique, *58(October, 1951), pp. 503-520.*

It is remarkable to find in the Epistle to the Galatians, considering its early date and polemical nature, a detailed exposition of the theology of baptism.

In this epistle St. Paul defends his past life as an Apostle and briefly reminds the Galatians of the spiritual experiences that accompanied their conversion. Then he turns to doctrinal exposition against the Jewish innovators who sought to induce the Galatians to adopt Jewish rites, especially circumcision.

The Apostle refutes the claims of the Judaizers by an exposition of the divine economy of salvation as manifested in the history of Abraham, when God promised to that patriarch that in his seed all nations would be blessed (Gen. 12:3). This promise was given to Abraham in virtue of his faith (Rom. 4:5). The Law of Moses with its rite of circumcision was temporary and cannot be the fulfillment of the promise. Once Christ has come, the Law must yield to Him who is the new and only means of justification. For Christ is the Seed in whom all must be incorporated by faith joined to baptism. This is constituted the Israel of the promise; the Israel of the flesh is terminated. This is the general argument of the epistle.

Several Important Texts

In order to discover St. Paul's doctrine on baptism, it is necessary to make a detailed examination of certain expressions contained in the epistle. Let us examine a few of them.

3:26 : "For you are all the children of God by faith, in Christ Jesus." We would prefer to take the verse this way: "You all are sons of God in Christ Jesus, and that by faith." This seems to fit better in the context, that by faith we are inserted into Christ, thus becoming sons of God and Abraham's spiritual descendents.

3:27 : "For as many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ." It is difficult to tell what "baptized in" or "into" means in St. Paul because it is followed by diverse objects in different passages. Some think it should mean an immersion into Christ, as into some kind of divine element. Others think that in addition to its ritualistic signification it is analogous to the expression "believe in Christ," since baptism and faith are inseparable. The second part of the verse, "you have put on Christ," expresses the same idea. This involves a total moral and religious transformation which makes us conformed to the image of Christ. To put on Christ by baptism is to become a son of God.

Baptism Blots Out All Accidental Differences

3:28 : "There is neither Jew nor Greek; there is neither bond nor free; there is neither male nor female. For you are all one in Christ Jesus." Here St. Paul brings out one of the primary effects of baptism, which is to destroy all preferences on God's part for race or sex or class, preferences cherished by the Jews.

3:29 : "And if you be Christ's, then are you the seed of Abraham, heirs according to the promise." With this St. Paul establishes his point that by incorporation in Christ the Christian becomes the seed of Abraham according to the promise. The new religious community in Christ is related to the old Hebrew community by its first representative, Abraham. This is the substance of St. Paul's explanation of the economy of salvation, and it puts an end to the argument of the Jews.

St. Paul describes two characteristics of Abraham: his faith, and the promise he received from God. This promise did not depend on the Law, because it was given four hundred and thirty years before the Law. Besides, it was given to Abraham in virtue of his faith, not because of his circumcision. Coming immediately from God, the promise is superior to the Law. The promise is to be verified in the fulness of time, and that time has now come. The Heir *par excellence* has appeared. Those who are united to Christ by faith and baptism, even without circumcision, without observance of the Law, are the true descendants of Abraham.

The Unbaptized Are Slaves

4:1-3 : "Now I say, as long as the heir is a child, he differeth nothing from a servant, though he be lord of all; but is under tutors and governors until the time appointed by the father; so we also, when we were children were serving under the elements of the world." Slavery is the term for the condition prior to baptism. It applies to the Hebrews under the Law, a temporary order of providence for perpetuating the messianic hope. Slavery "to the elements of the world" applies to the Galatians under their natural and rudimentary religion prior to their baptism.

4: 4-5 : "But when the fulness of the time was come, God sent his Son, made of a woman, made under the law: that he might redeem them who were under the law: that we might receive the adoption of sons." Now that the appointed time has come, the condition of mankind is changed in two ways. There is first the cessation of the Law and liberation from its precepts. Secondly, there is an adoption, a filial relation brought about by union with the Son of God.

4: 6-7 : "And because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying: Abba, Father. Therefore now he is not a servant, but a son. And if a son, an heir also through God." Our relation to God as sons is established by the gift of the Holy Spirit whose mission is inseparable from that of the Son. The Spirit effects the filiation, and at the same time His coming into the soul is evidence of the filiation.

All Three Persons Operate in Baptism

In baptism, therefore, the three divine Persons take part or operate. The Father sends the Son and the Holy Spirit; the Son redeems; the Holy Spirit brings about our filial relation and testifies to it. This is more than making us sons of Abraham. We are made sons of God Himself. It is done, not by the Law, but by faith, baptism, and the gift of the Holy Spirit. But baptism occupies the focal spot, since by it the believer is inserted into Christ and shares His riches.

Today the Judaizing controversy means little more to us than a critical moment in the Church's past. Yet it was the occasion on which St. Paul first presented his teaching on baptism. Prescinding from what is purely temporal, we will here synthesize this presentation, which, though Paul's first, is rich in meaning.

St. Paul's Doctrine on Baptism

The Apostle furnishes no indication whatever concerning the rite of baptism. Neither the matter nor the form of baptism is mentioned. What is suggested are the effects of baptism. Baptism is the beginning of a new life and by the operation of the three divine Persons our nature is elevated. Our baptism is the result of God's goodness towards us, just as our faith is truly a divine gift, even though it did demand cooperation from us. And the object of our faith is Christ. The various statements of the Apostle regarding this truth refer to an intellectual adherence and a surrender of ourselves to Christ as Lord through His Resurrection.

Our incorporation into Christ through faith and baptism is accomplished by the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of the Father and of the Son. We are sons of God by adoption, a filiation resembling that of the Son by nature. Our conformity to the image of the Son is to grow more and more during life, and to reach its fullness in heaven.

Formerly we were enemies of the Father; now we have become adopted sons. Formerly we were in bondage; now we have been redeemed by Christ and incorporated into Him. We have likewise acquired a new relation to the Holy Spirit, who now dwells in us and assists us in many ways.

From these new relations with God arise new relations with our fellow men. There can be no more barriers of race or sex or class. We are united into the Body of Christ. By baptism a new society is created—a society that is divine.

Baptism Completes the Divine Plan

Finally (and this is the main point of St. Paul's discussion) the baptized are the real descendants of Abraham, by imitation of his faith and incorporation into his Seed. Without any racial descent or affinity we have become the Israel of God. There is no break in the divine plan—there is merely an awaiting of the fullness of time. Then the end of the era of the Law introduces the beginning of the era of faith.

These are the essentials of what St. Paul perceived when, illumined by faith, he realized the transformation that was wrought in him by his baptism. And even at the very beginning of his ministry, as the Epistle to the Galatians shows us, he was ready to explain this doctrine.

"The Communist opposition to all forms of religious life and expression, as stated by Lenin, continues to be an important part of State policy in all Soviet-dominated territories. For example, the National Committee for a Free Europe reports that Polish periodicals and newspapers, following the Soviet practice, now write the word God with a small letter instead of a capital. The word itself is omitted wherever possible, being used only in articles attacking religious faiths."

Common Council for American Unity Press Release

The Function of Natural Reason in Eliciting the Act of Faith

Msgr. Peter Parente

Modern philosophies, based on subjectivism and immanentism, prefer a subjective and psychological method rather than an objective and metaphysical one. In recent years the act of faith has been subjected to a more profound analysis, especially in its psychological aspect. Some Catholics think the traditional schema of the act of faith should be adapted to new philosophical trends. Generally they attribute the act of faith more to the will than to the intellect, more to the feelings of the heart than to reason. In his article, Msgr. Parente points out the dangers of such a change and gives a clear presentation of the traditional view. This article first appeared in Doctor Communis, *(1950:2-3), pp. 10-21.*

In present-day discussions of the relationship between the natural and the supernatural, attention is focused particularly on the problem of the act of faith. In Scripture faith is said to be essentially intellectual. St. Paul describes it as the "proof of things that appear not" (Hebr. 11, 1), and the compendium of salvation. St. John portrays faith as the adherence of the believer to the person of Christ. Tradition, too, and the Fathers especially, carefully protect the rational foundation of faith. St. Augustine, summarizing tradition, correctly distinguishes between the work of the intellect in the preparation for faith and the light of faith itself, helping the intellect which already believes (*In Ps.* 118,3). The official teaching of the Church confirms this. The Council of Trent speaks of faith as an intellectual assent to divine truth. And the Vatican Council describes the preambles of faith and the function of the intellect and will and of divine grace in making the act of faith.

Until the rise of Modernism, almost all Catholic theologians agreed on the classical outline of faith. Faith is an assent of the intellect to truth revealed by God. This assent is given because of the authority of God revealing, with the will, under the influence of grace, commanding it and compensating for the lack of compelling intrinsic evidence. For this reason faith is formally in the intellect, causally in the will. Its formal object is the authority of God; its material object, the contents of revelation.

It would be unreasonable for man to believe something not intrinsically evident except by reason of infallible authority. To establish this authority it must be proved that God exists and has spoken. For this reason we separate the preambles from the act of faith, as follows:

a) Preambles
   1. Judgment of credibility (God's existence, His revelation, and accompanying miracles).
   2. Judgment of obligation to believe God.

b) Act of faith
   1. Command of the will (moving the intellect through a reflex judgment about the infallibility and authority of God).
   2. Assent of the intellect (now adhering to the truth because of the authority of God).

The Catholic Church teaches that faith is supernatural and salvific, that grace is required for the judgment of

obligation to believe, though it is not required for the judgment of credibility. Thus credibility constitutes the rational foundation of faith and is the object of apologetics.

Recently, as a result of study of the experience of converts, the psychological aspects of the act of faith have undergone careful scrutiny. Today Subjectivism, Immanentism, and the Protestant notion of fiducial faith have changed the intellectual concept of faith into something more affective and volitional. All anti-intellectual systems, especially irrational mysticism, discard rationality from faith.

Even some Catholics, adapting themselves to new philosophical trends, alter partially the classical outline of the origin of faith and attribute it more to the will and feelings than to reason, more to grace than to our own efforts. These are their main contentions:

1. The preambles of faith are not needed since faith can begin without preparation.
2. Credibility of divine truth comes from impulses of the heart and will rather than from syllogistic reasoning.
3. Faith is intrinsically volitional rather than intellectual, because it is a movement of the whole man toward God.
4. Both credibility and faith originate only from grace. A rational credibility of a purely natural kind is impossible.
5. These assertions contradict neither St. Thomas nor the official teaching of the Church if rightly understood.

In this paper we shall defend the traditional explanation without, however, overlooking the new theories. We shall stress two points: the essential structure of the act of faith, and the nature and value of the rational preparation for faith, called credibility. In the first point grace and faith aid reason; in the second, reason works alone. This emphasis on reason in faith is necessary to avoid the blind religious feelings of Modernism.

Structure of the Act of Faith

In making the act of faith, the intellect and will operate at the same time. Because faith is an assent to revealed truth, the act of faith is formally in the intellect. But since revealed truths are not intrinsically evident, the will causes faith by ordering assent to these truths on God's authority. Modern philosophers create confusion by giving power of insight to the will or even to the feelings. Some Catholics have compromised with this idea. Rousselot, for example, says that a kind of love for all being is rooted in the intellect and so he explains the assent of faith by an affective inclination towards divine objects in so far as grace attracts our soul to the things of God. Such a theory conflicts with sound philosophy and theology by attributing to the will what is specifically proper to the intellect.

It is an injustice to St. Thomas to distort some of the passages into an approval of affective faith. In *De Ver.*, 14, 4, St. Thomas clearly states that the assent of faith is not caused by thinking, but by willing. Faith is not mere opinion since it is a strong adherence to truth. And it differs from knowledge since the intellect is not satisfied but has a dynamic tendency toward clearer knowledge of the thing believed. And this dynamism, proper to the intellect assenting under influence of the will, exemplifies that tendency of the whole man towards God. The will gives strength and firmness to the assent of faith, but always as a moving force, not as an intuitive power, for this power remains proper to the intellect.

Thus St. Thomas preserves the essential intellectual structure of faith, but enlivens it with such dynamism of the will that, with proper precautions, it can meet the demands of sound modern psychology. (Cf. also II-II, 2,2.)

Nature and Importance of Credibility

To understand faith we need, too, a complete and exact treatment of credibility. In the recent encyclical, *Humani Generis,* we read once again that human reason is necessary to prove the existence of God, and to establish the foundations of Christian faith by miracles and prophecies. The Vatican Council is quite explicit on the importance of basing the judgment of credibility on the evidence of miracles. In traditional theology, and especially in St. Thomas, we are told that "faith presupposes natural knowledge just as grace presupposes nature" (I, 2, 2, ad 1).

In the material object of faith, which is truth revealed by God, the Angelic Doctor carefully distinguishes between the object as believed *(creditum)* and the object as believable *(credibile).* Individual truths *(creditum)* cannot at the same time be perceived by reason and believed by faith. But taken *in globo* under the common note of credibility *(credibile),* they are somehow perceived by reason as things which are to be believed because of the evidence of miracles. (II-II, 2, 1, ad 1; 2, 10, ad 2).

St. Thomas further points out that faith is still meritorious even though the intellect is induced to believe by grace and by God's authority confirmed by miracles. These arguments do not force themselves upon the intellect the way real knowledge does, though they offer sufficient inducement for believing. The attitude of St. Thomas regarding rational credibility is further clarified when he tells us that the devils have natural faith because they are forced by the evidence of miracles. Even though external, sensible miracles do not clarify individual truths, they do have great probative power (II-II, 5, 2; *De Ver.* 1c, ad 4; *De Ver.,* 14, 9).

Interior inspirations also prepare the soul for faith and to some it looks as though St. Thomas prefers them to miracles (III, 55, 5, ad 3; *In Joannem,* 2, 2; *In Rom.,* 8, 6; II-II, 2, 4, ad 3; *Quodlib.,* II, 4, 6). He lists three aids to faith: (1) an interior call or motion of the mind by which man is moved by God to assent to the truths of faith; (2) teaching and preaching; and (3) sensible miracles. But St. Thomas actually describes the entire journey to faith (II-II, 6, 1), and outlines three steps. The first is from miracles to credibility; the second is the obligation to believe God, for which grace is required; the third is the assent of faith made only by means of grace (II-II, 6, 1).

Post-Modernist theology has raised questions about this classical outline of faith, questions which demand an answer. The real difficulty lies in the traditional doctrine which demands that faith be rational, free, and supernatural at the same time. If any one of these elements is pushed too far, the others suffer. For this reason I think it opportune to clarify some important points about Thomistic credibility.

1. The Object of Credibility

The proper object of credibility is revealed truth as believable (credible). The material object of apologetics is the fact of revelation and its formal object is the rational credibility of revealed truths. Credibility must not be referred to the fact of revelation and miracles, but to the revealed truths. These are made believable (credible) by reason, but are believed by faith.

2. Logical Proof and Certitude

By a reasoning process we conclude that the testimony is true which a divine legate gives concerning revelation because he confirms his divine mandate with miracles and because God cannot confirm falsehood. Since it concerns human actions, this proof gives moral certitude which is real certitude and constitutes a rational foundation for faith. Some try to reduce this to a probability or to free certitude, which depends more on good will or grace than on sound arguments. This removes the rational foundation of faith.

3. Credibility and the Act of Faith

The ontological bond between the fact of revelation and the revealed truth itself is shown more or less clearly by logical proof. Psychologically, by the judgment of credibility, the individual person is exposed to revealed truth which is obscure and neither proved nor provable. In this case the intellect cannot be forced to assent, and the will and grace must overcome this psychological phenomenon. The will alone gives only natural faith and the assent lacks absolute solidity. Grace makes up for this and the assent becomes supernatural, based on the authority of God revealing. Thus the judgment of credibility is not the foundation of faith but only a simple condition preceding it.

4. Objective and Subjective Credibility

Objective credibility is an historical inquiry into the fact of revelation by study of documents, etc. Systematically presented, this is apologetics. Subjective credibility is relative to the interior and exterior dispositions and gifts of various individuals. Thus we may admit, with Gardeil and Poulpiquet, the need of supplementary subjective helps in forming a sure judgment of credibility, helps adapted to the dispositions of the individuals.

I must now dwell briefly on some recent difficulties. First of all, it is said that reason plays no part in the faith of children and uneducated adults. However, the baptized receive efficacious help to believe from the habit of faith which they already possess. For both baptized and unbaptized the testimony of a mother or pastor often suffices to form a rudimentary judgment of credibility.

Some converts testify to a sudden conversion of the heart and imagination without reasoning. St. Augustine, though, states that there is in such cases an abbreviated reasoning process. Still we admit individual instances, e.g. St. Paul, in which a most powerful grace can supply partially, or wholly, for the usual requisites which prepare for and elicit the act of faith. Regarding the will and emotions, we see that St. Thomas requires that the will order the assent of faith, and he speaks frequently of the natural desire to see God. Modern psychology also requires that faith possess a personal note, a relationship between God and the individual. This is clearly expressed by St. John and St. Augustine.

Thus we see that we must integrate into the whole traditional theology of faith certain psychological aspects without, however, overturning the essential intellectual structure of faith and of rational credibility which precedes it.

Against the errors of the past, Catholic teaching on faith stands firm, faithful to the Gospels and to tradition, vigorously preserving the place of supernatural grace, of human liberty, and of reason—an admirable monument of truth.

Contemplation, Theology, and the Moral Life According to *The Epistle to the Hebrews*

Ceslaus Spicq, O.P.

St. Peter himself remarked that there are passages in the letters of his beloved brother Paul which are difficult to understand; hence it is not surprising if we are still at work to gain a better understanding of St. Paul's profound and inspiring thought. In this article on the Epistle to the Hebrews *Fr. Spicq shows how this work must be understood in the light of the author's intention, which was to brace this faltering Jewish community, and how the means to be applied make up the parts of the Epistle. Fr. Spicq's article appeared in* Recherches de Science Religieuse; Mélanges Jules Lebreton, *39(April-October, 1951), pp. 289-300, under the title "Contemplation, Théologie et Vie Morale d'après l'Épître aux Hébreux."*

It is not an easy task for the exegete to harmonize the various lines of thought of the Epistle to the Hebrews into a coherent scheme. First of all, there is the problem of the relationship between the moral exhortations and the speculative considerations. But more than that, there is the problem of the precise connection between the theme of Christ the High Priest and that of faith. Some interpreters claim that these elements cannot be systematized into a rigorous sequence of thought. It would be artificial, of course, to try to fit each detail into a rigorous outline, but since the Epistle of the Hebrews is one of the most closely argued of the New Testament writings, the relationship of the main currents of thought to one another should be discernible.

A Principle of Interpretation

In the Middle Ages the primary principle of interpretation was to see in the author's intention the source of intelligibility of his work. By applying this principle to the Epistle to the Hebrews we hope to clarify the relationship of its parts, or at least bring out a fundamental aspect of the spirituality of the epistle.

St. Paul's intention in this epistle was to strengthen and encourage the distressed and weary Christian converts from Judaism. This is evidenced by the whole tenor of the letter as well as by St. Paul's express statement, "bear with the word of exhortation" (13:22). The doctrinal developments in the epistle attract more attention by reason of their length and originality, but even they are not drafted without reference to local and psychological circumstances.

The Jews to whom this epistle is addressed have need of encouragement because they have renounced their ancient religion and national traditions. They are more conscious of what they have given up in the splendor of the Mosaic liturgy than what they have gained in their new manner of life (10:25; 13:10). They are ostracized, persecuted by their fellow Jews (10:32-34), and their feeling of inferiority is sapping the vitality of their faith. For a Jew accustomed to see divine favor in material prosperity such trials are an indication of God's abandonment (cf. 6:10) and some are ready even to give up their spiritual privileges for immediate tangible satisfaction. They are becoming weak-kneed

(12:12), are tempted (2:18), and have become sluggish (6:12).

Realizing all this, St. Paul appeals directly to these new Christians not to drift away (2:1). They must run the race with perseverance, as athletes (12:1), and not be led away (13:9), or overcome with weariness (12:3). It is plain then that St. Paul's intention in the Epistle to the Hebrews is to fortify his readers against any falling off.

Remedy for Spiritual Lassitude

Having diagnosed their disease, St. Paul must apply the proper remedy. What is it that will brace their energies, revive their courage, and nourish their faith and fidelity? St. Paul bids them: "Contemplate the Apostle and High Priest of our confession, Jesus" (3:1). They will be renewed spiritually by considering the fundamentals of their faith.

We know both from the Gospels and from St. Paul that the Christian life supposed the adherence of spirit and heart to the truth, and that a virtuous life was the logical consequence of this. But the Epistle to the Hebrews, more than any other inspired writing, declares the necessity of profound knowledge and reflection on the truths of faith for perfecting the moral life as well as for persevering in it.

Faith Is the Answer

The Hebrews are really pilgrims in this world and the light and inspiration they need on their journey comes from faith. It is faith which illumines the invisible world, and gives proof of the things one cannot see (11:1). Noah, who regulated his conduct in accord with God's unforeseeable design, and Moses, who constructed the tabernacle in accord with the heavenly model revealed to him by God, are the models of this faith (8:5; 11:26 ff.). By faith one evaluates two worlds, and chooses between them. By faith, Christians know that they will have their reward on the day of judgment.

But the great object of contemplation for the believer is the person of Jesus Himself. Faith reveals Him both in splendor (2:9) and in suffering (12:3). He is the source and the perfection of faith and fidelity (12:2). The believer, however, is not content merely with "looking" at these realities. Just as Abraham reasoned that God had power to raise Isaac from the dead (11:19), so by reasoning the Christian comes to the knowledge that Christ is priest according to the order of Melchisedek.

Faith, therefore, in this epistle is essentially contemplative, and as such directly orders the moral life. But how propose contemplating in spirit a celestial Christ to these Christians who have lost their moral fiber and contact with the spiritual? The answer: to restore their moral life they must grow in the knowledge of their faith—by constructing a theology from their faith. They will overcome their spiritual lassitude by penetrating more deeply the truths of their faith.

This contemplation of the truths of faith is the key to an understanding of the Epistle to the Hebrews. It explains the passage from 5:11 to 6:20, where the author suddenly turns from the theme on Christ the Priest to the spiritual status of his readers, saying it is difficult to make them understand. Up to this point he has exalted the royalty of Christ, His superiority, His virtues, and has given a brief sketch of His priesthood. But before going on, he declares that his readers are unable to assimilate profound theology. They still need the milk of infants rather than the solid food of spiritual maturity. Their faculties are untrained and they can give no account of what holiness means.

How to Grow in Faith

The psychologico-doctrinal transition which occurs at this point is typical of the epistle and illustrates the author's viewpoint. "Therefore," *(quapropter)* he says, "let us pass over the initial teachings concerning Christ and press on to their full development" (6:1). The conclusive particle used shows that it is precisely *because* of their present spiritual deficiency that they must turn to contemplation of the faith and of the mystery of Christ. St. Paul does not hesitate to propose this as a remedy in spite of their apparent incapacity. They have the basic knowledge; he knows their deeper sentiments; and he now sets before them a development of their knowledge, the efficacious food of their souls. He asks them only to put themselves in contact with the word of God contained in Scripture, as he will explain it to them. God's word has its own special force and will open their understanding.

The Epistle to the Hebrews, therefore, makes this distinctive contribution to the whole body of St. Paul's writings; emphasis is placed on intellectual progress as a condition of growth in moral perfection. In this letter the remedy for spiritual negligence is meditation of the Scriptures; progress in Christian life is defined as a "function" of theological contemplation; reflection on revealed truth is necessary for perseverance and fidelity.

"Not To Resist Evil"

The Meaning of Matthew 5:39

Edmund Sutcliffe, S.J.

Scripture, 5 (April, 1952), pp. 33-35.

Did our Lord really forbid resistance to evil? Did He exhort His disciples to submit passively in all circumstances when He said, "'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth'; but I say to you not to resist evil, but if one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other"? (Matt. 5: 38-39).

The teaching and example of our Lord and His Apostle St. Paul suffice to show that our Saviour gave no commandment and not even an exhortation to turn the other cheek on every occasion. Christ said approvingly, "This know ye, that if the good man of the house knew what hour the thief would come, he would certainly watch and would not suffer his house to be broken open" (Matt. 24:43). This clearly supposes that the good man of the house might have to use, and would be justified in using, force to protect his house and property.

We know what was Jesus' conduct when unjustly struck by the servant of the High-Priest, "If I have spoken evil," He said, "give testimony of the evil; but if well, why strikest thou me?" (John 18:22-23). Jesus did not at once offer Himself for another blow, but protested against the wrong done to him. His example was imitated by St. Paul on more than one occasion (Acts 23:2-3; Acts 16:36-37). Moreover, St. Paul shows that it is the duty of the ruler to resist evil by force: "Princes are not a terror to the good work but to the evil . . . For [the prince] is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil" (Rom. 13:3-4). It is clear then, that neither Christ nor St. Paul gave a command or exhortation never to resist evil.

What then is the meaning of our Lord's words? The Old Testament law was summed up in the words "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." The purpose of the law was not brutality, but to restrain man's unbridled urge for revenge by forbidding the exaction of a greater injury than the malefactor had inflicted. But Christ, who came to perfect the Law, carries the war against the spirit of revenge further and exhorts us to overlook an offence whenever we can do so without harm to society or the offender himself. He even exhorts us not to avenge ourselves but to accept an offence in a spirit of humility.

St. Augustine sums up Christ's words: "What is the meaning of not returning evil for evil, if not to have an abhorrence of the lust for revenge? And that is to prefer to forgive injuries rather than to seek vengeance, and is simply to forget injuries . . ."

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY AND ITS METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION

Ugo Viglino, I.M.C.

Viglino's article first appeared in Doctor Communis, *1949 (May-December), pp. 127-145, was reprinted in* La Filosofia del Communismo, *Torino: Marietti, 1949. This volume of studies was translated into English as* The Philosophy of Communism, *New York: Fordham University Press, 1952.*

The problem of property and of private property in particular stands today at the very heart of the politico-social life of humanity. Since the fundamentals of human life depend on the regulation of property and distribution of goods, it is no wonder that this problem arouses the masses most intensely. Today (at least in Italy) the shortage of goods, the ruined cities, the people weakened with hunger have shocked even the most apathetic into realizing the urgency of solving the problem.

Private property is understood as "the right of the individual to enjoy exclusive possession of material goods with the right of free use and non-use." Among the many aspects involved in the problem of private property, we shall stress here the social function of property and the reasons of absolute order on which it is based. These two problems are essentially connected.

It is well to remember that the problem of property reached prominence only in the eighteenth century when economics emerged as an organized science. It was then that the foundations were laid for the two great modern concepts of property—the Individualistic-Capitalist and the Collectivist-Communist concepts.

Liberalism in Economics

The Liberalist tendency gives the individual primacy over society, makes him the bearer of all values, the unlimited master of all he has by juridical title. The sole function of the State is to maintain general order and to insure the rights of individuals. Maximum profit for the individual and the free play of economic laws will of necessity result in the greatest good for society as a whole.

Economic Liberalism received its consecration through the French Revolution. The liberty from oppression of king and aristocracy soon became the tool of a growing and uncontrolled capital. Other social classes, especially labor, fell before the selfish aims of the economically powerful. Pope Pius XI says of this super-Capitalism: "What strikes the eye in our times is not only the concentration of wealth, but also the accumulation of an enormous power, of a despotic lordship over the economy which is in the hands of a few men who, all too frequently, are not themselves property owners, but merely the depositaries and administrators of a capital which they manage to their own satisfaction and pleasure. This power becomes more despotic than ever in the hands of those men who, having money at their command, behave as if they were owners, dominate credit and control loans. They are, in a certain sense, the distributors of the very life blood of the economic organism. They hold, as it were, the heart of the economy in their hands. Without their permission a man may not even draw a breath" *(Quadragesimo Anno)*.

Marxist Economics

The reaction of the European conscience to this individualistic system is already history. In the last century Marx and Engels worked out their collectivistic concept of property.

They would abolish private property, substituting collective ownership of all the means of production and of capital.

Marxism arrived at this concept of property from a broad philosophical principle of absolute order and from the application to economics of what is chiefly an historic value. History is a naturalistic dialectical process determined by laws inherent in matter including man. Man's thought reflects, and is determined by, the economico-materialistic development in nature; the conditions of the material life of society become its ideas, its conscience, its duties. Marx, therefore, explains the social forms in which man organizes his life as functions of the economic factors such as wealth, methods of production, group relationships formed to suit the methods of production.

Marxism, looking at nineteenth-century big business, could state that the production of wealth had become a social function. Hence dialectic thinking, with class antagonism as the springboard, was moving toward collective-social ownership of wealth and the means of production. The Soviet experiment along these lines realized definite economic advances, but only at the expense of higher social, religious, and spiritual values.

The two extremes of collectivism and individualism suggest a position of equilibrium where the economy of nations must realize its goal of justice and social peace.

Private Property and Humán Nature

We cannot here attempt to justify private property as an urgent need of human nature. History records man's response to the problem. Private property, unlike collective property, was a fact before it was a theory. For man, spirit as well as flesh, sees that he cannot affirm and develop his freedom without the assistance of goods—and not goods for consumption only. Man by his labor tends to impress his inner dominion on external reality, to communicate something of himself to material reality. This prolongation of self through labor forms the principal metaphysical basis for the right of private property.

Abolish or restrict excessively the right of property and you weaken the best motives for individual initiative. The first man who fenced off a piece of land may well have taught us the invaluable lesson of the fruitfulness of toil.

Life under a collective regime could never be a full and human life. The organ of collectivism, holding the means of subsistence, must by its own principles repress man's inclination to save, to profit, and to improve himself. The ills of Capitalism are repeated, with the syndicate and the state holding unlimited power and wealth. Communism's appeal to human liberty is self-contradictory. Its sole and absolute norm of what is to be thought and done is the totalitarian state. Let there be no illusion. The means of production pass not to the proletariat, but to those few men who wield power in the party and state.

Private Property and Social Life

By stating that private property is a need of the individual and at the same time indicating the error of individualism, we help bring our problem into perspective. Though man is an individual he is also a part of society which is an indispensable condition of his full development. Now if property is a demand of man's nature, it will adapt itself to his other inherent demands, especially those of his social character. The social function of property enters into the right of property with a metaphysical-moral urgency, limiting it and bringing out its full value.

We are not speaking here of a simple juridical limitation. Such regulation has always protected from exploitation such properties as mines, waters, forests, national monuments, etc. From the juridical point of view, there are few goods over which man

really exercises an absolute and unconditioned property right; from the ethical point of view, there are none. Neither is use of property for national welfare, nor maximum productivity of goods the social function of property.

Rather the social function of property is logically prior to these extrinsic limitations, immanent in the right of property and based on the same reasons as the right itself.

Despite the supreme value of the human spirit, man's activity is not exclusively self-seeking. Dynamically he shows himself a social being, and only within society does he activate the highest values: religion, science, art—all that is good, true, and beautiful. Here he develops, affirms, and expands himself, not only by receiving the necessary material and spiritual elements, but also by giving of himself to others.

It is to society that the ego turns, not as the source of spiritual values, but as a necessary condition for their concrete realization. In this organism man, by fulfilling an infinite variety of functions, transcends himself and spreads to other spiritual beings the rays of his actions.

Man and Society

The bond linking man to society is not purely juridical; it is derived from the structure of man, and therefore metaphysical. The essential conditions for the existence of society are, then, metaphysical, and therefore ethical exigencies of the human being. Man is responsible for these conditions within the circle of his individual action.

Now the fundamental condition, the very basis of social co-existence is real and effective regulation and availability of material commodities for all. Lacking this condition, society is not a healthy organism. Any unbalance, any deficiency, however localized, reacts on the whole organism. If many men go hungry, the very premises of general well-being are absent, not only as regards economic well-being, which is evident, but also as regards spiritual, ethical, and civil well-being.

The economic condition of other men is, then, my concern. The misery of the hungry man reflects on me as a real diminution of my person. If I help raise his scale of living, I improve myself. Because wealth and property are so intimately related to the greater good of society, owners have a responsibility before God and man for the use they make of their property.

The Right to Own Is Limited

But the social function of property is not merely a condition pertaining to the *use* of goods. It intrinsically limits the very essence of the *right*, the *potestas* or dominion over property. It is prior to all concrete limitations to which property is subjected in particular situations, because it is linked with the substance of man in his social development.

Note that the social function of property is not to be understood exclusively in its relation to society as such. It affects first of all the relations of individual to individual. For example, because of this social function the owner of a spring may not prevent others from using it, nor may he charge excessively for its use.

This brings up the question of a postulated control of individual competition whereby a wealthy owner can unjustly ruin a small owner. Now the only justification for the right of property rests, ultimately, on the presumption that it produces the greater individual and social good. If we deny the presumption, do we not endanger the right or at least its practical application?

The notion of property presents this antinomy: If the right of property is a natural right, why do not all men share equal ownership? Plainly, equal ownership of the land by the millions of city-dwellers and farmers is impossible; but if juridical regulation were informed by the principle of the social function of the property it

would restrict dominion over land and make it serve the general and more profitable social interest.

Sound economic legislation must give concrete form to the general principles of the social function of property as circumstances demand, always, however, in accord with ethical-moral principles.

Social Function of Private Property

Private property fulfills a social function when it serves as a natural stimulus to initiative, saving, responsibility, and to enterprises in themselves arduous and little appreciated. But, if through abuse it brings wealth to the strong and leaves others deprived of the comforts and necessities of life, then it is the duty of public authority to apply coercive measures. Abuse does not justify suppressing the right, but it does call for restrictive measures to harmonize individual interests with the common good.

The problem of property is not purely an economic one. Pushed to its limits it invests the whole man, is part and parcel of his other problems. That is why the Christian concept formulates the problem of property in the metaphysical-ethical exigencies of the human person considered as a spiritual being.

Norms for Legislation

Positive legislation inspired by the principles of the social function of property should follow these general lines:

1) Extension should be given private property where possible. Where the functions of labor, capital, and management are united in one person, as on small farms, social conflict is effectually resolved. As a substitute for land ownership legislation should also extend the ownership of small personal property holdings and provide the means (loans without interest, insurance, etc.) so that a family may have savings. To obtain all this, continual work must be available to all citizens.

2) Great and untilled landed properties, since they are not sufficiently productive for the common good, should be broken up. Expropriation represents a public juridical sanction for neglect in fulfilling a social obligation. Nor would total indemnity be necessary since it would restore the owner to an identical position of wealth.

3) Labor unions should have juridical protection. Labor should be admitted to a share in management and in profits. Since labor is the incarnation of the spiritual and material forces of the human being, the product of labor is part of the life of the worker. To treat human labor as merchandise is radically unjust.

4) Fiscal burdens should be distributed according to wealth possessed. Because all society makes an indispensible contribution to individual wealth, the wealthy should, where necessary, be required to contribute to social assistance.

5) The right of inheritance should be restricted. This institution, justified by the incentive it gives to thrift and production, was never intended to guarantee a life of idle pleasure to the heir, nor to suspend his personal activity.

6) In normal times public authority should impose a certain control on trade, production, and consumption to obviate excessive competition and protect the small businessman.

7) Normally, individual initiative should not be hampered unless it has failed in its function of social utility.

8) Legislation should promote the solidarity and collaboration of all classes and factors involved in the production of wealth.

Need for Charity

Such positive legislation is not meant to replace works of Christian charity and human solidarity. No one knows how much the free circulation

of goods among friends, relatives, and strangers by gift, loan, etc. has contributed to the effective social function of property.

One more important point. The social function of property deriving from a study of human nature recognizes no national boundaries. The earth is for the use of all men. And when once the possibilities of exchange and commerce are exhausted, the unproductive lands of the earth should be opened to the labor of men. This done, we shall be on our way to a world-wide union of the human race.

OTHER ARTICLES ON RIGHTS TO PROPERTY

1. J. Sommet, "Le Droit de Propriété Face à la Misère," *Revue de l'Action Populaire,* 61(1952), pp. 498-515. A discussion of the problem of ownership and national economic welfare—a clash on the nature of true wealth, on the hierarchy of tasks, on methods to be used, in a solution of the problem. While insisting on the right of property and the duty of social use, the evangelical spirit, the right Christian attitude must play an important part.
2. J. Sommet, "Pie XII et les Problèmes sociaux en 1952," *Revue de l'Action Populaire,* 64(January, 1953), 4-22. A selection of the four most significant papal documents of the year on social questions. In all four documents strong emphasis is placed on the true concept of property involving greater responsibility on the part of all individuals and the state.
3. Réné Théry, "Avoir et propriéte," *Mélanges de Science Religieuse* 8(1951), 85-110. A philosophical analysis of the idea of property with a good study of the following topics: a) possession, b) possession-for-use and possession-for-trade, c) ownership and possession. The conclusion reached is that a man cannot affirm himself in a truly personal manner without a private right over certain durable goods. Without such right, and possessing only consumable goods he leads a sub-human day-to-day existence without past and future.

Acton: The Wavy Line

John Fitzsimmons

Blackfriars, 33(Oct., 1925), pp. 405-411.

Recently there has been a good deal of interest in the life and work of John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, better known as Lord Acton. He is most familiar to Catholics perhaps for his opposition to the defining of the Dogma of the Infallibility of the Pope by the Vatican Council.

The year 1952 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Lord Acton, a very controversial English Catholic intellectual. The anniversary was commemorated by the publication of two books, *Essays On Church and State,* by Lord Acton, edited by Douglas Woodruff, the first volume of what is to be a complete edition of Acton's works, and *Acton's Political Philosophy,* by G. E. Fasnacht.

The essays on Church and State have been chosen from Acton's contributions to those short-lived but impressive English reviews of the 1860's, *The Rambler* and the *Home and Foreign Review.* To this volume Mr. Woodruff contributes an introduction whose chief aim is to tell the story of these reviews with regard to Acton, of how the effort of the laity in England came to grief in its first attempt at a lay apostolate of the press. The age was not propitious for such initiative and the spirit of the Syllabus brooded over any suspected temporizing with the spirit of Acton's age. No attempt is made in his introduction to assess Acton's thought, but one must agree with Mr. Woodruff's conclusion that, "his [Acton's] relevance for the twentieth century comes from his prophetic pre-occupation with the very questions with which the twentieth century has found itself occupied. The great objects of his studies in history were the moral ends of government, the relation of politics to morality." In this respect Acton wrote of himself, "I have never had any contemporaries, but spent years in looking for men wise enough to solve the problems that puzzled me, not in religion or politics so much as along the wavy line between the two."

Contrary to what Mr. Fasnacht tries to show, to the extent that Acton accepted "the wavy line" between religion and politics as inevitable, Acton found it impossible to construct a real theory of politics. However, fifty years after his death there is still profit to be found in the many incidental insights which were the by-products of the major preoccupations of the Catholic scholar acclaimed as the most erudite man in Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

The Church and the Democratic State

Gustave Weigel, S.J.

Father Weigel, professor of ecclesiology at Woodstock College, Maryland, is one of the outstanding theological writers in the country. The following article is a digest of a paper given at the College of St. Thomas, Collegeville, Minnesota. In it, Father Weigel discusses the two principal theories of Church-State relations and makes a positive contribution of his own. The article first appeared in Thought, *27(Summer, 1952), pp. 165-184.*

To give my remarks precision it is well to note what is meant by "Church" and "democratic." There is no ambiguity about "Church," for we take it as Catholics understand it; "democratic," however, unless defined, is meaningless. By "democracy" I mean the American political arrangement alone; no other type of democracy is included.

It is beyond controversy to say that Catholics in the United States *as a matter of fact* have never felt any conflict in conscience between their democratic allegiance and their Catholic commitments, and this includes not only the theologically uninitiated but also prudent and universally respected American Catholic theologians. We need only read American history to see that Catholicism has had some part in the rise and growth of the United States of America. However, despite what Catholics themselves feel about their allegiance, history will also show that Catholics have always been accused of being disloyal citizens by some of their compatriots because of their religious affiliation. Such attacks are always resented.

Today such an attack challenging the Catholic doctrine of Church and State has been raised. Voices like that of Paul Blanshard maintain that Catholicism is a threat to the American way of life. Notice that the attack is centered not on the fact of Catholic loyalty to America, but rather on the logicality of the Catholic way of acting in the light of authoritative Catholic doctrine on Church and State relationships.

Attempts to Clarify Catholic Position

As a consequence of such circumstances, Catholic theologians have been re-examining the Catholic doctrine of Church and State relationships. The reason is not that they are wondering if the Blanshardians are right—they have not even the slightest doubt that they are woefully wrong—but that they wish to put in palpable clarity the authentic position of Catholicism in this question.

Unfortunately, the first fruit of this research has been a theological controversy, more to be regretted than desired, even though fortunately it has had no repercussion on Catholics at large, who simply do not feel that there is any difficulty in harmonizing Catholicism and Americanism.

It is in reference to this controversy that I wish to discuss the theme of my essay—The Church and the Democratic State. The controversy concerns the proper formulation of the perennial Catholic doctrine of Church and State in order to bring out its compatibility with the American democratic system.

The Dynamic Expositors

One side of this controversy proposes a fresh formulation of the Catholic theory of Church and State with a view to showing that there is no antagonism between it and the American arrangement, clearly defined in the first and tenth articles of the Bill of Rights attached to the original Constitution. To do this these Catholic theologians are reworking the presen-

tations of their doctrine which have been current heretofore. I call these men the *dynamic expositors* and my sympathies favor them. No final theory has been forthcoming from this group of theologians; so far they have been asking questions and making observations. Only one of them has written and lectured on this subject; he is Fr. John Courtney Murray, S.J.

The Static Expositors

In opposition to this trend of thought is another group of Catholic thinkers. While appreciating what the dynamic expositors are trying to do, they nevertheless feel that such an effort is needless, dangerous, and misleading. For them the current statements in manuals and treatises on the whole question are satisfactory and incapable of substantial improvement. All that is needed is a brave exposition of the current formulations. I shall refer to this group as the *static expositors*. Most of their thought has been carried in *The American Ecclesiastical Review*.

Such then are the proponents of both sides of the controversy. What about the controversy itself? First of all, there are a number of points on which both sides agree, and it is good that these be borne in mind as we progress through the controversy:

1. Both sides accept the same concept of theological method; the theologian must derive his data from the infallible teaching power of the Church with true docility and without any intention of deliberately or indeliberately changing what has been taught.

2. Both agree that the Church is a supernatural society fully equipped to attain its end, and superior to any natural society.

3. All agree that the commonwealth is distinct from the Church by its nature and that in its own field the commonwealth is independent of the Church, which has, however, indirect power over temporal matters.

4. It is equally conceded that in the light of revelation demands are made of man that the commonwealth, *qua* natural, cannot know and therefore with subjective innocence can ignore.

5. It is beyond controversy that the Church is in its mission and constitution so independent of the State that the latter cannot impose conditions and restrictions on the former; although it is also true and the State does not owe its origin or right of existence to the Church.

Differences of the Two Schools

So much for the points of agreement; now how do the dynamic and static expositors oppose each other? Basically the whole controversy arose because of two opposed conceptions of the harmony required between Church and State. Specifically, the static expositors affirm that the State has the objective obligation to recognize the Catholic Church as the true religion. Therefore, the State must defend the Catholic Church even to the point of suppressing, if necessary, freedom of speech in this area. Moreover, the State has to legislate in the light of the doctrine of the Catholic Church and not merely in the light of the natural law. Even more, the State must profess the Catholic religion and render acts of cult according to the Catholic scheme, although it is admitted that the State cannot force non-Catholics into the Catholic Church.

However, the static expositors make an important distinction. They say that these are objective obligations from which the legislators and governors can be freed by their ignorance. Such a condition must be tolerated by the Church, but such toleration must recognize that the restriction in the Constitution, whereby governors as such are deprived of the power to profess the Catholic religion and to defend it, is an error. Although this is so, Catholics can nonetheless be loyal to the Constitution and such loyalty will produce no problem of conscience.

This is the static expositors' position and it leans heavily on outstanding progenitors, especially Pope Leo XIII, who formulated most of these propositions in his encyclicals. Hence the dynamic expositors seem to be faced with the dilemma of proposing a doctrine which is opposed to papal pronouncements. To this problem the dynamic expositors have a definite answer. But before considering that answer, it would be well to consider what it is that the dynamic expositors find wrong in the position of the static expositors.

The dynamic expositors recognize the papal pronouncements, but disagree with the final position of the static expositors. How can American Catholics be loyal to and satisfied with the American Constitution in face of an objective obligation to go counter to it? They certainly cannot enthusiastically and sincerely accept the Constitution when one of its basic directives is an error that Catholics and even non-Catholics must deny. Even toleration in face of an irremediable state of affairs, though in itself a sound principle, must take positive action to correct such error. From this it would seem that the static expositors would have to agree fundamentally with the claim that there is a chasm separating Catholicism and American democracy.

The Popes and American Government

Such an obligation is not manifested in American Catholic history. Even the Popes when addressing American Catholics have always praised the vitality and genuinity of American Catholicism without ever pointing out the existence of an objective obligation to change the American norms of civic life. Because of these circumstances the dynamic expositors have denied the obligation and have bent their powers to reconsidering the propositions which the static expositors understand in such a way as to make the obligation an inevitable conclusion.

In making such a denial, the dynamic expositors are immediately confronted with reconciling their position to the papal pronouncements of Leo XIII. On the premise that these documents can be neither dismissed or ignored, reconsideration of the Leonine doctrine was inaugurated. The important point in this reconsideration was the fact that Leonine doctrine had to be considered in the light of further teachings of later Popes, above all those of Pius XII. This was not an innovation, for the static expositors themselves firmly adhered to the same principle when the teachings of Gelasius and Boniface VIII regarding Church and State were being discussed. Consequently, the historical situation must be taken into account when considering papal teachings whether they be those of Boniface or those of Leo.

The Historical Background of Leo's Pronouncements

What, then, was the historical situation into which Leo put his teachings? It was a time of rampant political liberalism in which state power was consciously and deliberately used against Catholicism as a theory and as a fact. Democratic processes were denied Catholics. In defense of the Catholics Leo had to propose the Catholic position authoritatively. This duel between Church and State was fought in the realm of theory, for it was on naturalistic principles and rationalistic philosophy that the liberals justified their action. Against their theory of the unconditionally autonomous state, Leo stated that State was not autonomous, but rather obligated to truth and religion, because man is not merely a creature of pure reason but a *rational creature redeemed by Christ.* Against the liberalistic theory that the Church is not an independent society and that

the objective of governmental action was secular welfare understood in a materialistic sense, Leo stated that man is under God and that this holds true for man in society as well as an individual.

Furthermore, from Leo's doctrine we derive the principle that the *concrete pursuit* of the common good can objectively and not merely subjectively dispense governors in determined circumstances from following the true theory of government. It is right at times to permit what is speculatively wrong. What times and what circumstances justify such an action will be a question of prudence. But as long as the true theory is not denied or a false one invoked, but only the expediency of promoting the common good is cited, the action can be criticized from the viewpoint of prudence. But whether the criticism is derived from the correct theory, is not practically relevant.

Can the State Worship?

Leo also states that the State is obliged to worship God according to the divinely ordained cult (by which he understands Catholic worship). Therefore, he says the State must be Catholic. How is this doctrine to be interpreted? If by the word "State" is meant the constitutional form of the commonwealth or the legal institutions of government established by a constitution, there can be no "State" worship, since "State" in such a context is an abstract principle of organization quite incapable of worship, which entails human acts. If by "State" we mean the governors and legislators, then a state cult is certainly possible. Consequently Leo XIII, supposing Catholic citizens and Catholic governors (for only these can take part in Catholic worship), declares that citizens *qua* citizens and governors *qua* governors must take part in worship as an act of the commonwealth.

I respectfully submit that this doctrine is not immediately pertinent to the concrete American governmental situation which must determine legislators' action in prudently promoting the American common welfare, for Leo's doctrine is in the ideal order and does not concern the pragmatic task of governing. The Declaration of Independence is not a philosophic principle of government; the Constitution is based on a prudential arrangement for pragmatic action, — it is a practical program for a concrete task of governing the American people. In order to attain the common good, the Constitution required prudence in its framers rather than theoretical speculation.

Correct Understanding of Leo's Doctrine

Consequently, Leo gave an abstract theory of government which is not critical of the American Constitution, a practical instrument for the common good. Nor is he correcting pragmatic norms prudently erected, for he recognized such norms as a legitimate starting point when nothing of itself evil is enacted. In very fact there is no clash between Leo's sociology and the objectives of the American Constitution, since they are on different planes of thought and do not meet. Moreover, the general principles applicable to the *concrete task of government* which Leo outlined are not violated but used in the construction and maintenance of the Constitution.

All this is confirmed by American life. The true Catholic ideal of social life is not denied by the American community as it has been organized by the Constitution. On the other hand, the Catholic's ideal of government does not hamper his acceptance of the practical directives of the Constitution. In this connection it should be remembered that the Constitution did not have to correct rationalist and liberal philosophies as Leo had to do.

For America does not concentrate all power in one individual or make one man the symbol of the nation, but creates institutions and organizations whereby the power vested in the people can be exercised.

Leo says explicitly that recession from the theoretical ideal is licit and it is this that the American arrangement does in prudent pursuit of peace and prosperity.

Conclusion To Be Drawn

The conclusion from all this is that there is no problem because of the lack of American State-worship. Such a problem would be present in the Leonine theory of civil society but not in the concrete objective situation. Static expositors base their claim on this theory of civil society. But such a theory is obligatory only when its application is not *de facto* detrimental to the end of society—the peace and prosperity of the commonwealth. When it is detrimental, as it is in the concrete situation of the American people, the obligation disappears both objectively and subjectively; it simply isn't there. Pius XII explicitly recommends our generic kind of government for other countries.

The dynamic expositors have raised a question and answered it without any demolishing objections from opponents. Moreover, they have synthesized the principles for relations of Church and State by maintaining:

(a) that the Church as a supernatural society is superior to the state and free from its jurisdiction;

(b) that the arrangements of the commonwealth must be prudently dictated by the truth applied to, and tempered by, a concrete situation so that it can effectively promote the common good in terms of peace and prosperity of the citizen-body;

(c) that the Church and the State must collaborate since both are for the same human person.

The contribution of the static expositors in this controversy has been to set forth authoritatively the ideal structure of the commonwealth. They have not, however, stressed sufficiently the truth that this philosophy is not a pragmatic norm for government in the concrete. Non-ideal arrangements can be tolerated but not accepted as the ideal. But such a structure of tolerance objectively dispenses citizens and governors from the obligation arising from the theoretical ideal, since the immediate source of obligation for government is always the concrete good of peace and prosperity.

Let us conclude by assessing the net result of the controversy. There has been a clarification of doctrine in many points:

1. There is no ground for conflict between a Catholic's loyalties to God and his country.

2. There is a side of Catholic thought insufficiently treated in the manuals, i.e., the practical side.

3. Catholic philosophy concerns the ideal which never exists anywhere in its purity because of original sin. Recession from this ideal is permitted for the common good, though false philsophy cannot be embraced nor this ideal ever despised.

BIBLIOGRAHPY ON THE CHURCH-STATE CONTROVERSY

Fenton, Joseph Clifford, "*Time* and Pope Leo," *A.E.R. (American Ecclesiastical Review)*, 114(March, 1946), pp. 369-375. Fr. Fenton successfully takes issue with *Time's* assertions: (1) Leo XIII condemned "the U. S. principle of separation of Church and State"; (2) the U. S. hierarchy had largely ignored the Pope's teaching.

Fenton, J. C., "The Catholic Church and Freedom of Religion," *A.E.R.*, 115(Oct., 1946), pp. 286-301. Fr. Fenton criticizes the inaccurate and misleading use which *Time* and the *Christian Herald* had made of Fr. Connell's brochure, *Freedom of Worship.*

Murray, John Courtney, S.J., "Governmental Repression of Heresy," *Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America,* pp. 26-98. Two separate though related problems are distinguished: Church and Human Society; Church and State. After insisting upon the necessity of approaching the problem from a historical viewpoint, the author explains the theory of direct power held in the Middle Ages, in which temporal authority was considered an emanation of spiritual authority. The theory of indirect power proposed by Bellarmine and modified by John of Paris is "good 16th century stuff," but the principles upon which it rests must be adapted to suit modern temporal powers. Against this background Fr. Murray's own position on Church-State relations is defended against charges of Catholic Liberalism.

Connell, Francis J., C.SS.R., "Christ the King of Civil Rulers," *A.E.R.,* 119(Oct., 1948), pp. 244-253. The state is a temporal society. Temporal welfare of the citizens includes the exercise of both natural and supernatural virtues. Therefore, *per se,* the Catholic state must acknowledge the Church, uphold the Church's laws regarding marriage, etc.

Murray, J. C., S.J., "St. Robert Bellarmine on the Indirect Power," *Th. St. (Theological Studies),* 9(Dec., 1948), pp. 491-535. Bellarmine's solution of the problem of church-state relationship is due to the historical setting in which he found himself and the apologetic aim of his writing. While he broke away from the traditional direct-power theory, practically he so extended Church authority that it ceased to be purely spiritual. Having thrown out the theory, he brings it back, modified, but substantially itself. It was inevitable, writing as he was to unite the two powers within the one *respublica Christiana.* Consequently, he did not construct a theory of relations between *the* Church and *the* State, for this was not his problem. The solution remained for a future age.

Murray, J. C., S.J., "Contemporary Orientations of Catholic Thought on Church and State in the Light of History," *Th. St.,* 10(June, 1949), pp. 177-234. It seems that the view of churchmen in the present day Church-State problem is veering away from the explanations of Bellarmine. The history of the stages of development recognizes that "freedom of the Church" does not include the concept of "religion of the State." Consequently, there need be no conflict between man's freedom as citizen of the State and citizen of the Church.

Murray, J. C., S.J., "Current Theology: On Religious Freedom," *Th. St.,* 10(Sept., 1949), pp. 409-432. The author gives the gist of three recent articles on the problem by Jacques Leclercq, Kuhnelt-Ledduhn, and Max Pribilla, S.J. Commenting on these, he notes how the problem has shifted ground even since the 19th century. Obviously the disputes over Spain prompt his remarks, and he distinguishes the constitutional concept "the religion of the State" from the dogmatic concept "the freedom of the Church." The religion of the State has dogmatic standing only in so far as it is a means to the freedom of the Church.

Shea, George W., "Catholic Doctrine and 'The Religion of the State,'" *A.E.R.,* 123 (Sept., 1950), pp. 161-174. Fr. Shea limits his articles to the theory of relations which should obtain *per se* between the Church and a Catholic State. He maintains that according to the traditional view, the exclusive recognition and profession of Catholicism by the State is a permanent part of Catholic doctrine. Papal pronouncements declare that the State has the moral obligation to restrict dissident sects. Canon 1381 expresses the duty of the State to repress heresy by restricting public circulation of heretical doctrines. Thus, according to Fr. Shea, Fr. Murray has not answered *all* the arguments against his position.

Fenton, J. C., "The Relation of the Christian State to the Catholic Church According to the *Pontificale Romanum,*" *A.E.R.,* 123(Sept., 1950), pp. 214-218. An analysis of the section on the blessings and coronation of the king in the *Pontificale Romanum* shows that the Church expects the Catholic sovereign of a Catholic nation to profess and protect the Catholic faith in his capacity as head of the State.

Murray, J. C., S.J., "The Problem of the Religion of the State," *A.E.R.,* 124(May, 1951), pp. 327-352. Fr. Murray's answer to Fr. Shea resolves itself into two heads: (1) The State's obligation to profess the true religion even in a "Catholic Society," cannot be extended to include legal, political establishment of Catholicism as the official state-religion. The State would be obliged to nothing more than safeguarding the freedom of the Church. (2) *Immediate* illation from theological truth to constitutional law is dialectically inadmissible.

Fenton, J. C., "The Status of a Controversy," *A.E.R.*, 126(June, 1951), pp. 451-458. After briefly reviewing the controversy, Fr. Fenton (1) questions Fr. Murray's contention that the Church at first merely tolerated her establishment as the religion of the State; (2) maintains that there really can exist such a thing as the ideal Church-State relationship; (3) declares that if "the State" cannot perform an act of religion, then neither can there be right and wrong in relation to the State; (4) insists that the illation from theological truth to constitutional law *is* valid, otherwise no individual man or society would be bound by any duty.

Connell, F. J., C.SS.R., "The Theory of the 'Lay State,'" *A.E.R.*, 125(July, 1951), pp. 7-18. Fr. Connell raises the following objections to Fr. Murray's opinion: (1) The State at times has a *positive, direct* obligation to acknowledge the authority of the Church's positive legislation. (2) Revelation is morally necessary to know even the moral (natural) law in all its details. (3) *Temporal* is not identical with *natural*. True temporal happiness is impossible without supernatural blessings. (4) The traditional doctrine gives adequate assurance to fair-minded American non-Catholics.

Shea, G. W., "Catholic Orientations on Church and State," *A.E.R.*, 125(Dec., 1951), pp. 405-416. Fr. v. Nell-Breuning, an internationally renowned expert in the social sciences, takes his stand with the conservative school of thought on Church-State relations, holding that it would be precipitate and unwise to accept uncritically the newer theories, as though the older were quite obsolete and abandoned. Fr. Shea sets out to show this by his review of *Beiträge zu einem Wörterbuch der Politik*, to which Nell-Breuning is the chief contributor.

Murray, J. C., S. J., "For the Freedom and Transcendence of the Church," *A.E.R.*, 126(Jan., 1952), pp. 28-48. Fr. Murray criticizes two views expressed or implied by Fr. Connell in his article, "The Theory of the Lay State": (1) The right of the Catholic Church to preach the Gospel independently of every civil power as implying an obligation of the State to *permit* Catholic missionaries to preach, contains implications which violate the *Quas Primas* of Pius XI which states that the Church has "a natural right to complete freedom and immunity from the power of the State." (2) Fr. Connell's "conceptionalism"—use of terms to which there corresponds only a mental construct but no identifiable reality—leads him to err in imposing upon the State the obligation of investigating the truth of Catholicism.

Connell, F. J., C.SS.R., "Reply to Father Murray," *A.E.R.*, 126(Jan., 1952), pp. 49-59. (1) Fr. Connell denies that he implied that the State possesses a "jurisdictional empowerment" to *permit* the Church to preach since he had explicitly stated the contrary. (2) Concerning the duty of civil rulers to investigate the credentials of Catholicism, Fr. Connell objects to Fr. Murray's stand on the grounds that the principles of his argument would lead to inadmissible conclusions.

Fenton, J. C., "Principles underlying Traditional Church-State Doctrine," *A.E.R.*, 126 (June, 1952), pp. 452-462. Fr. Fenton traces the objective obligation of civil society to worship God in the Catholic Religion to the fundamental religious obligations of every man and every social unit. This duty of civil society is also based on the truth that there is one objectively acceptable religious worship.

Murray, J. C., S.J., "The Church and Totalitarian Democracy," *Th. St.*, 13(Dec., 1952), pp. 525-563. In the French Revolution, (1) the *civitas humana* displaced the *civitas Dei* as the ultimate reality; (2) reason was acknowledged as superior to divine revelation; (3) human perfectibility superseded the doctrine of sin and redemption. Pope Leo XIII's utterances, therefore, can be clearly understood only against the background of this political atmosphere.

Murray, J. C., S.J., "Leo XIII on Church and State: The General Structure of the Controversy," *Th. St.*, 14(Mar., 1953), pp. 1-30. About twenty of the documents of Leo XIII relevant to the problem of Church and State are of major importance. This article is an attempt to outline the structure of the Leonine doctrine, to indicate the themes developed and the relative emphasis given to each, their relationships with each other, and their appositeness to the historical problems of the time.

HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN MEDICINE

Some Moral Observations

Eugene Tesson, S.J.

Scientific medical research techniques have grown tremendously in recent years, bringing with them more complicated moral problems. This is especially true with regard to human experimentation in medicine. The following article points out what is demanded by the moral law and justice in such experimentation. It appeared in Cahiers Laënnec, *12(June, 1952), pp. 27-39, under the title "Réflexions Morales."*

With the development of scientific research techniques and the attendant duty to use them, there has arisen a serious problem. How apply these techniques to the study of man, who, while an object of scientific research, is at the same time a person? Although the problem is a real one for medicine, still its danger should not be exaggerated. The right balance can be struck, if both physician and patient realize the implications of their respective positions.

The Position of the Patient

Granted that a doctor with spiritual insight and a sound grasp of psychology will use these gifts effectively in healing the sick, the fact remains the patient must recognize that a man of science, as such, must deal with him also as a nature, and not just as a person. And from the fact that the patient seeks medical care two conclusions follow:

1) the patient implicitly approves of previous scientific observation (for the knowledge from which he hopes to profit is based on it); and

2) the patient in entrusting himself to the physician likewise necessarily submits himself to observation.

Medical Activity

On the other hand, for the physician there is the primary principle that a code of medical ethics does and should exist. Essential to it are these two points:

1) The physician should not only know and use the ordinary means of healing, but, loyal to the fundamental ideals of his profession, he will constantly seek, by observation and reflection to deepen and broaden his knowledge and skill.

2) A patient, as a person, at all times deserves to be treated with justice and charity. This point, above all, demands special thought by the medical profession.

I. Experimentation on the Sick

First some clarification on the term "experimentation." It should not be limited to research in which only healthy persons are the subjects. Animal experimentation does not remove all risk in applying new remedies to cure men; and verification of discoveries is not complete until perhaps thousands of cases have been handled. Can it be said, for example, that we have reached definitive conclusions about how to use the antibiotics? And note that whether the subject be well or ill, the method of science is fundamentally the same.

With these facts in mind, we may list a few moral principles, easy enough to formulate. (For the more difficult practical application we must rely on a prudent physician.)

1) No substance may be used in treating men unless some knowledge of it has been derived from animal experimentation.

2) When application is finally made to man, various contributory factors (gravity of disease, value of present remedies, risks of new treatment, etc.) must be carefully weighed. The more desperate the patient's condition and the less effective the present remedies, the stronger will be the right to attempt to cure by procedures which *can* have the opposite effect.

3) The patient or those responsible for him should be told of additional danger in a new treatment, and the greater the risk, the greater the need for consent by the interested parties.

4) Patients certain to die, or with no friends, relatives, or dependents, may never be used as "guinea pigs." The abandoned man has a special right to our charity.

5) Ultimately the decision rests with the rightly formed conscience of the physician. A man of skill and experience may licitly and laudably attempt what would be criminally rash in another.

II. Experimentation on the Healthy

We should note that this heading does not cover everything we take up here. Our concern is primarily with experimentation that is not directed immediately to effecting a cure, and this can be performed on a subject who may be either well or ill.

The type of experiments with which we are concerned here would be: inoculation with disease germs, followed by an attempt to cure; or contact with a diseased substance to determine the effect of absorption.

French civil law forbids both of the above mentioned experiments. What does natural law demand?

Here theologians distinguish two groups of subjects. Criminals condemned to death make up one group, and all other men make up the second. The most dangerous experiments may be performed on condemned criminals without, it seems, a violation of natural law. Fr. Payen stipulates, however, that both the government and the subject must consent. As for other men, Catholic moralists voice almost absolute rejection of experimentation not directly therapeutic. The tradition to which Fr. Payen refers would say that regardless of the consent of the subject, if the experiment will certainly or probably bring serious irreparable damage, it cannot be allowed.

But were all the elements of the problem clear to older authors? Because of developments in medical science, some of their opinions have already been generally abandoned. For instance, St. Alphonsus would allow no treatment likely to shorten life. Now, Fr. Payen in treating of anesthetics admits that certain circumstances would allow a physician to administer a dose of morphine which without killing directly—something never permitted—would nevertheless contribute to an earlier death.

To reject experimentation because certain death or serious illness would follow is to indicate that one has oversimplified the problem. The principle of the double effect, it is claimed, will not allow this experiment on a healthy subject, because the good of humanity, the good effect, would be realized *through* the bad effect, the serious illness or death of the subject. But, we object, this reasoning seems open to question, for it assumes certitude of serious harm, whereas there is no certitude, but rather a risk.

A Few Practical Rules

Some points, however, are easily acceptable:

1) It makes no difference whether the subject is oneself or another.

2) Experimentation on others, if allowed, always demands the consent of the interested parties. This implies that where there is question of experimentation on prisoners, special care should be exercised that their consent be in no way forced.

3) Animal experimentation should always precede. Application to man should not be made until knowledge of the new technique is as complete as possible. Hence its use on man would be the last step in the investigation.

4) When possible, a new remedy should be tried on a sick person for whom all other means have failed. Thus the probability of cure would serve to counterbalance the danger of harm.

5) Obviously, where death would almost certainly follow, experimentation is never justifiable.

The physician, however, remains faced with the difficult responsibility of applying moral principles like these to concrete cases. We think he could allow a subject to be bitten by mosquitoes to discover the means by which a disease is transmitted, a disease, we add, which he can cure. Vaccination likewise is admissible. Fr. Payen admits it because the aim is to defend against disease. With regard to other experiments, we ask, "Is there not a parallel between running a serious risk to save many innocent lives during a war, and running a risk, even relatively serious, to save men from the ravages of disease? If the one is allowed, why not the other?"

In conclusion we would like to observe that faithful use of scientific techniques will, no doubt, vastly enrich mankind with new powers over organic and inorganic matter, but it should be borne in mind that science is no absolute. All engaged in research and in applying its fruits must first of all follow the moral law and practice justice and charity. And even though one line of scientific progress may be slowed somewhat, the totality of scientific work loses nothing if research and its use are imbued with genuine charity.

OTHER ARTICLES ON MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION

1. The March and June issues of *Cashiers Laënnec* for 1952 were devoted entirely to a symposium on the subject of human experimentation in medicine. In addition to the article digested above, other worthwhile articles found in the two issues are:

   Pequignot, H., "Les Expérimentateurs Inconscients et Irresponsables," (March), pp. 53-62.

   Tanret, P., Le Médecin et l'Expérimentation Humaine," (March), pp. 13-26.

   Auby, J.-M., "La Responsabilité Civile et Pénale en cas d'Expérimentation sur l'Homme." (June), pp. 17-27.

   Pierre, G., "L'Expérimentation Humaine en Allemagne Nazie de 1940 à 1945." (June), pp. 40-65.

2. Articles on medical experimentation:

   Tesson, E., "Le Dernier Cobaye," *Études* (February, 1953), pp. 220-228. This is another article on the moral principles involved in medical experimentation on man, "the last guinea pig."

   "The Problem of Experimentation on Human Beings" (A Symposium), *Science,* 117(February 27, 1953), pp. 205-215:

   Shimkin, Michael B., "The Research Worker's Point of View," pp. 205-207;
   Guttentag, Otto E., "The Physician's Point of View," pp. 207-210;
   Kidd, Alexander M., "Limits of the Right of a Person to Consent to Experimentation on Himself," pp. 211-212;
   Johnson, W. H., "Civil Rights of Military Personnel Regarding Medical Care and Experimental Procedures," pp. 212-215.

3. There have been several addresses by Pope Pius XII on experimental medicine. These also touched on the much-discussed qustions of lobotomy and psychoanalysis.

In his allocution of September 13, 1952, "To Members of the First International Congress of Histopathology of the Nervous System," the Pope pointed out the moral limits of medical methods of research and treatment in psychosurgery. His Holiness enlarged on the subject of medical experimentation in another allocution on April 13, 1953, "To the International Congress on Psychotherapy and Clinical Psychology." Here he pointed out that psychotherapy and clinical psychology must always consider man (1) as a psychic unit and totality; (2) as a structural unit in himself; (3) as a social unit; and (4) as a transcendent unit, that is to say, as tending towards God.

4. Articles on lobotomy:

"Pour ou contre la Leucotomie Préfrontale?", *Cahiers Laënnec,* 12(September, 1952), pp. 30-39. In this article appear the replies of doctors to a questionnaire dealing with this new surgical process.

Kelly, Gerald, S.J., "Lobotomy," *Medico-Moral Problems* (St. Louis, Mo.: Catholic Hospital Association, 1949), Part I, pp. 40-43; "More About Lobotomy," Part II, pp. 42-45; "Lobotomy for Pain Relief," Part III, pp. 29-32.

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Scrupulosity and the Present Data of Psychiatry

Albert Barbaste, S.J.

In "Le Scrupule et les Données Actuelles de la Psychiatrie," Father Albert Barbaste, S.J., shows how modern psychiatry can help us come to a deeper understanding of scrupulosity. The article appeared in Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique, *(January-March, 1952), pp. 3-17. For more than twenty years the author has been teaching psychology at the Jesuit Scholasticate at Vals in France.*

Scrupulosity is a malady that is not peculiar to our own time; in every age masters of the spiritual life have given good advice on how to treat it. However, in the light of recent advances in psychiatry, it may now be possible to determine more precisely the nature of this neurosis, more prevalent today, perhaps, than ever before.

As is well known, neurosis is quite different from psychosis or insanity. Neurosis is a pathological mental condition characterized by functional disturbances without damage to personality. It is much less serious than psychosis, in which personality itself is clearly altered.

Scruples belong to a common type of neuroses that Pierre Janet has isolated and aptly described as "psychasthenia" (soul-weakness). Scrupulosity is a species of psychasthenia characterized by an inordinate preoccupation with the moral and religious order. The extent to which patients are affected ranges from those who lead an ordinary life exteriorly, but suffer interior pangs at times, to those whose behavior is so abnormal that they must be committed to an asylum.

First Symptom: Abulia

In those affected with psychasthenia one usually finds the following psychic symptoms. First, there is habitual abulia, or inability to decide. These are the irresolute, the hesitating, those who never make up their minds except with the greatest difficulty, and that often only under the imperious pressure of life. And so they act like automatons, without really willing what they do. This deep-seated indecision and lack of self-mastery explains their constant sense of insecurity, which is heightened by an ever-present awareness of the imperfect and incomplete nature of all that they experience and do. Pierre Janet has called this the sense of inadequacy *(sentiment d'incomplétude)*. A psychasthenic will not be able to make up his mind to take a necessary trip, or he will return repeatedly to assure himself that he has really closed the gas cock tight. Such a state naturally makes peace of mind impossible.

In the scrupulous person this abulia manifests itself in his inordinate preoccupation with religion and morality. A scrupulous person will begin over and over the penance which his confessor gave him. Or the housewife who is asked to do a simple problem of addition can add up the figures accurately and easily until she is told that they represent bills which she owes her grocers. Immediately she becomes upset, and starts to add up the simple column again and again, without ever being able to satisfy her conscience that she isn't making a mistake.

Second Symptom: Doubts

Besides indecision, a sense of inadequacy, and sadness, there is also found in psychasthenics a distressing

liability to doubts, obsession, and phobias. Everyone experiences reasonable doubt at times. But the doubt of the psychasthenic is morbid, without any justifying cause; it cannot be settled, and is painful to the point of anguish. In desperation he has recourse to innumerable checks and rechecks. Not all manage to resolve their doubts by their own unaided efforts. Most find it more convenient to seek assurance from others, wearing their neighbors out with one question after another.

The anxious doubts of the scrupulous person pertain to the moral and religious life. Did he resist temptations strongly enough, especially those against purity, faith, and charity? Did he confess with the proper dispositions, and do the penance imposed? These harassing questions and others more trivial eventually drive him to endless examinations of conscience. But the scrupulous person fails to reassure himself, because he demands absolute certitude in matters where this is impossible. To ease his disquiet he finally has recourse to a confessor or his spiritual director, hoping to obtain with their assistance the peace that eludes his own unaided efforts.

Third Symptom: Obsessions

Psychasthenics suffer also from obsessions, that is, images or ideas that impose themselves upon consciousness almost continuously, despite all efforts to get rid of them. Obsessions are discordant, that is, out of harmony with the subject's habitual attitude. Moreover, they are also "impulsive," tending spontaneously to reduce themselves to action, especially when the action involved is very insignificant.

Being real psychasthenics, the scrupulous likewise often suffer from discordant obsessions, the very thought of which horrifies them. A pure young girl will be haunted by lewd imaginations, quite against her will, even on communion days. This strange discordance of the obsessing idea is easily explained by the law of association by contrast: any idea tends quite naturally to suggest its contrary.

When an idea contrary to a well-balanced person's habitual attitude is suggested to him, he finds it quite easy to dismiss it from his conscious mind. But the scrupulous person is frightened and flustered by the very thought of doing a thing for which he has such a positive abhorrence. Yet, he is unable to put it out of his mind. Clearly, then, obsessions are not culpable; in fact, they are a very good indication of one's love for God. This will not, however, prevent them from being reduced to action in certain cases. This again is in virtue of a psychological law that an image monopolizing the field of consciousness infallibly tends toward the action corresponding to it, without either the individual's free will or consequently his responsibility being necessarily involved.

Fourth Symptom: Phobias

Finally, psychasthenics are subject to innumerable phobias. Phobias are foolish and irrational fears, out of all proportion to their object or cause, but of very great intensity. One person will be seized by an agonizing fear, with palpitations of the heart and tremblings over his whole body, when he finds himself in a closed room (claustrophobia). Another will be afraid of dust (mysophobia), or of diseases (nosophobia). The number of phobias is legion, and their nature varies endlessly.

As for the scrupulous person, any matter that touches his conscience even remotely is likely to give rise to a phobia. Before even a most unimportant action, he will be overpowered by a paralyzing fear of committing a grave fault.

One can easily see how these troubles make life miserable for the

scrupulous. The fact that they are perfectly well aware of the abnormal and pathological character of their malady or troubles only adds to their misery. They strain all their resources in an unavailing effort to free themselves of their folly, shaking their heads, striking the air, and even beating themselves, in the grip of "compulsory agitations," as Pierre Janet calls them. Sometimes they will even hurl stinging accusations or bitter insults at the devil, who, they believe, has victimized them.

A Concrete Example

But all these scientific analyses are rather abstract, and do not reveal the psychasthenic mentality as graphically as this candid account of a good and courageous person afflicted with psychasthenia.

"Suddenly my stomach tightens up, there's a choking in my throat, and my torture begins. The bad thoughts come . . . I want to drive them out, but they keep coming back . . . It is terrible to be in a struggle like this! To have a head that goes around and around without my being able to stop it; to be a madman and still quite rational, for all that . . . I am double . . . at the very time that I am trying to plan what I want to do, another unwanted thought is in my mind . . . distracting me and always hindering me from doing what I want . . . ."

It is easy to see how such discordant obsessions, so difficult to control, can bring a person to a kind of psychic split, or to serious troubles resembling those occurring in delirium. Usually, however, the patient's intelligence and aptitude for scholarly achievement are not affected by psychasthenia and scrupulosity. In fact, scrupulosity is often found in people of the highest intelligence and very finest sensibilities.

While the symptoms are easily recognizable, not so the underlying causes—not, at least, in true scrupulosity. For, even a very stable and well-balanced person can be upset for a time by a passing seizure of scruples, brought on by physical exhaustion, a crisis of faith, a devastating moral shock, or by an indiscreet first fervor after a conversion. But this is a chance illness which disappears without a trace with rest and the suppression of the cause that provoked it. True scrupulosity, though, according to all psychiatrists, is a pathological mental state that is constitutional. It is inherent in the hereditary physical make-up of the subject. This explains why scruples generally appear quite early in life, usually in youth or adolescence, as has been scientifically shown.

Successful treatment requires detailed knowledge of the hereditary physiological and psychological traits that predispose to scrupulosity, and this is precisely where our knowledge is deficient. Certainly a lack of balance in the neuro-endocrine system, and more especially in the vago-sympathetic nervous system, is a preponderant factor; however, there is no question of damage to the brain itself. Quite naturally one thinks, then, not of a physical lesion, but rather of a functional disorder of the type upon which electric shock treatments have recently thrown so much light. These treatments, though, have no effect upon psychasthenia and scrupulosity.

The Cause of Psychasthenia

What, then, is the cause of psychasthenia? Janet holds that it is explained by a lowering of "psychological tension"—that psychic quality which determines our capacity for mental synthesis. Insufficient tension, while permitting easy and simple actions, renders impossible all complex and difficult actions, especially those implying close adaptation to reality. This lowering of the psychological tension leaves the patient unable to

cope with his doubts, phobias, and obsessions. The bodily organ or source of this tension is unknown.

To explain compulsory agitations Janet introduces the concept of "derivation." When a force is unable to produce the action for which it was mobilized, it spends itself in useless activity of an inferior kind. When the scrupulous person cannot master his doubts, obsessions, and phobias, he resorts to table-pounding, running about in a disorganized fashion, or shows other signs of great agitation.

Although Janet's interpretation offers a general explanation of the various forms of psychasthenia, it accounts less satisfactorily for the particular traits of each phobia and each individual obsession. This is because Janet did not study the psychological origin of obsessions.

The Freudian School

Freud and his school, though, did pursue this in their researches. At the risk of giving too sketchy an outline of their interpretation, one might say that according to them, neuroses arise from a conflict between psychic forces, a conflict that results in the repression of certain tendencies into the subconscious. Repressed, these tendencies are not dead—far from it—at every instant they try to force their way into the conscious. At times they succeed, but in disguise, under cover of symbols which make them endurable to one's conscience. These disguises and symbols are precisely the neurotic symptoms: phobias and obsessions.

If Freud's analysis renders intelligible some phobias and certain well-defined obsessions, it is less successful in explaining the indecision, insecurity, and sadness, the many and varied doubts, obsessions, and phobias that characterize scrupulosity.

The psychoanalysts themselves, who insist above all on the psychological mechanism of obsession, recognize also its physical basis. Some even say that obsessional maladies stem from marriages which already contain conflicting biological elements.

Since, then, the cause of scrupulosity is not simply psychic nor purely somatic, but is psycho-somatic, its treatment must include both psychotherapy and physiotherapy. Therefore, "psycho-neuroses" seems a better term than "neuroses" to describe psychasthenia and scrupulosity.

The Treatment of Scrupulosity and the Present Data of Psychiatry

Albert Barbaste, S.J.

Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique, 28(April-June, 1952), pp. 97-120.

In this article Father Barbaste continued his study of scrupulosity, discussing modern psychiatry's contribution to the treatment of scrupulosity.

Sound therapeutics requires that scrupulosity be treated both in its causes and in its symptoms, especially in its dominant symptom.

There are two schools of thought on the question of precisely what constitutes the dominant symptom of scrupulosity. One group, following Morel and others, holds that it is a hypersensitive fear-response to situations involving conscience. Another school, headed by Janet, maintains that the dominant symptom is the sense of inadequacy, springing from a habit of inattention and vague preoccupation. In practice, the recommendations of both schools should be utilized for best results.

The hypersensitivity to fear stressed by the first school has always been recognized

as a symptom to be reckoned with in any treatment of scrupulosity. Psychiatry strongly emphasizes the necessity of bringing within bounds this excessive fear of sin. Sometimes the patient will be seeing sin where there is no sin. Or, when the scrupulous person does sin, his responsibility will often be considerably diminished by great intensity of a persistent obsession. Merely pointing this out will often lessen his anguish and help him shake off the obsession. He must be encouraged to struggle perseveringly against his obsession, always with the assured hope that he can and will free himself eventually from its tyranny. In addition, he should learn that the origin of most of these obsessions is explained by the psychological law of contrasts; otherwise, he is likely to feel that he is a lost soul, possessed even now by the devil. Thus encouraged, he will gain a profound and lasting peace of soul, and will have gone far toward a complete cure. Finally, it is of the utmost importance that the scrupulous person be distracted from his fears. He must learn to be genuinely concerned for others, dedicating himself wholeheartedly to their welfare. Forgetting himself in this wholesome manner, he will then have no time for the morbid and self-centered introspection that provides such a fertile field for scruples.

Treating the sense of inadequacy consists mainly, according to Janet, in getting the scrupulous person to fix his attention upon the task of the moment, thus checking his tendency to daydream. Then, by constant practice, admittedly painful and exhausting, he can to a remarkable degree regain the ability to concentrate and to utilize his will-power.

In addition to the dominant symptoms, the underlying physical and psychical causes should also be attacked. As regards physical causes, the precise physical organ contributing to scrupulosity's hypersensitive fear-response and vague inattention has not been identified. It is certain, though, that the scrupulous person will benefit greatly from a generally healthful way of living, with special emphasis upon plenty of sleep.

Only in extreme cases, when obsession is accompanied by real anguish similar to that found in melancholy, should use be made of electric shock treatments, which, while leaving untouched the obsession itself, will at least relieve the concomitant anguish. And as for frontal lobotomy, it must be kept as a last resort, for it has bad as well as good effects upon personality traits.

The psychical cause of the sense of inadequacy is, according to Janet, a low level of what he calls psychological tension. It is always difficult to attain certitude in the solution of a personal moral problem, but it is much more difficult for the scrupulous person, because he does not have enough psychological tension for this complex task.

In treating this cause, one must first reduce the difficulties besetting the scrupulous by allowing him to solve for himself only simple and clear-cut moral problems that he can handle easily. He must learn not to worry about the rest, but to rely upon the infinite goodness of God and the guidance of his spiritual director. The next thing is to raise the low level of psychological tension. This energy can be bolstered indirectly by a general program of physical therapy designed to increase the supply of nervous tension, which is so intimately connected with psychological tension. More direct is the re-education of the power of attention, which is the most successful psychical method of increasing psychological tension.

The Freudian therapy consists in making the subject aware of the repressed desire in his subconscious mind by means of psychoanalysis. However, according to many experts in the field, psychoanalysis has failed to cure any genuine case of psychasthenia.

Modern psychiatry, then, endorses and completes the standard methods of spiritual writers for treating scrupulosity. The first step must always be the inspiring in the scrupulous of a sincere, ardent and dauntless desire of being cured. Then, one must obtain from him a blind obedience in every trial, not by threats and reproaches, but by a devoted service, patience and kindness that will win his confidence.



". . . is no progress of religion possible within the Church of Christ? To be sure, there has to be progress. . . . But it must be progress in the proper sense of the word, and not a change in faith. Progress means that each thing grows within itself, whereas change implies that one thing is transformed into another. Hence, it must be that understanding, knowledge, and wisdom grow and advance mightily in individuals as well as in the community, in a single person as well as in the Church as a whole, and this gradually according to age and history."

St. Vincent of Lerins (440 A.D.)

Reflections On Breviary Reform

Dom P. Salmon, O.S.B.

Among Europeans the question of Breviary Reform is not a new one. Since the establishment by Blessed Pius X of a commission to reform the liturgy, much has been written and is still being written on the question. In this article which appeared in L'Ami du Clergé, *63(Nov. 29, 1951), pp. 721-726, the author lays down some essential principles which should guide any attempts to reform the Office. His views, it is to be remembered, are those of one whose attitude towards the Breviary is colored by a life intimately devoted to the choral recitation of the Office.*

There have been numerous answers to my previous work *(l'Ami du Clergé,* 1950, p. 705-713) on Breviary Reform, which I wish to discuss in this paper, especially those that bear on the question of the public celebration and private recitation of the Divine Office. Those who are in favor of reform have made many suggestions. They complain that the office is too complex, that it requires too much searching and page-turning, that the succession of responses and versicles, proper to the choral Office is more calculated to irritate one than to foster his piety. Another desires to see the Psalter and Scripture spread out over a longer period of time, rather than crammed into a week or a year respectively. Others would have the ferial psalms recited with still greater frequency so that their value too could be appreciated. The supression of octaves, the elimination of excessive number of feast days, the combining of several saints into groups commemorated together, the correction of the lessons, the restoration of the ancient hymn texts, these seem to be elements that would be popular with all. Some would even reject the small hours, as being suited more to the use of monks than to the use of the ordinary priest. These and other suggestions are proposed.

Suggestions for Reform

Detailed schemes also are suggested: revision of the make-up of the individual hours, various suggestions for simplifying their recitation, various means of integrating the Breviary with the Mass. But too often such plans are inspired more by pious feelings rather than by any true liturgical sense. If reform continued along such lines little or nothing would be gained. I do not deny that such proposals have their advantages and attractive elements but they do not seek a reform of the Breviary, but rather the establishment of a completely new Office. The loss involved is in no way proportionate to the good that might be achieved.

Some are opposed almost entirely to an idea of reform. Such opposition could arise from a keen sense of the obligation which the Church imposes. Others are opposed because they see in such change a spirit of criticism entirely foreign to so sacred an institution. It seems to them to indicate a failure to appreciate truly something that is of the essence of the priestly life. There is danger too of usurping the place of authority. Also, the very multiplicity of plans and projects seems to be against reform, for from so many plans it is difficult to

imagine how a single coherent plan could be arranged.

Such fears arise from praiseworthy motives. But we need not fear that subjects will assume the place of authority in this regard. The Church is well able to handle such a problem. On the contrary, it is in her own interest that the Church should consult the needs of her children in this regard.

The question of the Breviary is one that will best be settled by a general expression of ideas, needs, and difficulties, since the question itself is so complex and of such importance for the priests of the world.

The Liturgy a Living Thing

But one must remember that the Church, as a living body, is obliged to preserve her own traditions, and at the same time to evolve, reform, renew, keeping her evolution consistent with her true self. Her public prayer, the liturgy, does not escape this law. In the past the Breviary has never ceased to undergo change. That such development has stopped now is hard to realize. This is true even though we have arrived in our day at a more or less static concept of the liturgy. Since the time of St. Pius V, (1568) all legislation in this matter has been left to the Congregation of Rites, which fact has tended to limit initiative in this regard.

In this matter of reform, however, as in all other things, it is difficult to know where to stop. Those who seek to guard and keep the liturgical laws wonder just how it is possible to guide the reform along the lines of traditional principles. There is need to find the mean between extreme reform and overcautious timidity. In doing this, then, it seems best to keep the general organization of the Office with all its essential elements, while correcting only what is in need of change.

Some practical ways this could be done are: by realigning the calendar, simplifying the number of feasts, eliminating the *preces,* the suffragia and commemorations, abridging the rubrics, correcting the lessons and making a new selection of them, and providing the new Ordo, simplified for private recitation. And all this without touching the general make-up of the Office. But on the mere pretext of making the Office more intelligible, it would be fatal to deprive it of its heritage and its symbolism. The Breviary cannot be allowed to become a book of private meditation, or spiritual reading, or a sort of historical chronicle.

I have sought on other occasions (*Ephemerides Liturgicae,* 1949, p. 412; *Vita Christiana,* 1950, p. 546; *La Maison Dieu* 1951, No. 27, p. 1) to show that the Roman Breviary is in special need of reform because its true worth is not entirely realized by those who read it every day. The Office which the Roman Breviary contains is basically a service developed for common choral recitation at fixed times during the course of the day and night, whereas the ordinary priest is accustomed to recite it alone, in a low voice and at no special time, but rather at his own convenience.

History of the Office

If we go back to the beginnings of the Office, we find that public prayer developed in a rather spontaneous fashion. The early assemblies of the Christians, with their communal readings, psalms, and hymns form the foundations of what later became the Office. This prayer was not precise and determined; it was the function of the religious and laity more than of the clergy; it was more private than public. Only gradually did it become official and public.

About the time of the sixth century, the make-up of the Office grew out of the distribution of the different parts of the services to the different churches of the city and locality. The clergy took part according to their rank and position in the celebration of the services of a determined church.

The idea of a complete daily office celebrated each day under obligation by the clergy of a determined church finds its roots in the monastic foundations established around the larger churches and basilicas. This was especially true in Rome where the Popes entrusted the services of the great basilicas to religious. From there it spread throughout the West as more and more bishops were selected from the monasteries. The liturgy of these groups also served as the basis of the Carolingian reform in the early ninth century.

During this period, not all the clerics had the same Office, as all did not have the same share in its recitation, but each assisted according to his rank and order. Those who were charged with country parishes and whose work was for the most part missionary, took very little part in the public Offices. Those who were attached to the basilicas and city churches and who had the requisite leisure devoted a great deal of time to the choral recitation of the Office. Likewise those clerics who were attached to a certain church and received a benefice from it were obliged to share in the solemn Offices of that church. It was this form that the Office took, and in which it lasted up to the Council of Trent, and persists even today in European cathedrals and churches to which a "college" of canons is attached.

The Office and Public Prayer

The main difficulty, when one speaks of the reform of the Breviary, comes, I think, from the fact that one refers almost universally to the Roman Breviary and its private recitation, without taking into consideration its long evolution. Since the solemn choral recitation is almost abandoned, at least by the secular clergy, many conclude that its public recitation is an exception, whereas in reality it remains the rule, however little carried into execution. It seems almost to be an anomaly that one who recites his office privately, should be obliged to recite a prayer fashioned for public, choral recital. To recite privately a public prayer does not in itself give that prayer a "public" value, and does not of itself confer on it the value of a "public" act. Such "public" value can come to that act, if it is *designated* as such by the Church. In this way the prayer becomes public. This meaning of public prayer, as "prayer imposed by the Church" takes its origin in a juridical sense of obligation.

Such a concept of public prayer did not originate with the Holy See, but was at first rather the work of the bishops who legislated in this way for their subjects. Provincial and general councils likewise spread the idea, and finally the Popes following such decisions adopted their policy concerning the private recitation of the Office. As the public recitation became rarer, the private recitation became part of the official prayer of the Church.

Late Development of Private Recitation

The unification of formulae had a great deal to do with the stabilization of the private recitation of the Breviary. In the beginning each individual diocese organized and celebrated its own peculiar Office. They prayed in the name and for the benefit of the whole Church, but not in any uniform pattern. The Carolingian reform was a unification based on the Office of the Roman basilicas but it did not suppress local differences. When St.

Pius V imposed the Roman Breviary on the whole Church, the consequent uniformity of formulae had its advantages. But this took place at the very time that the custom of private recitation was growing. The point that is missed is that while the public recitation (where still found) was enriched tremendously by such a move, the private recitation, as a mere substitute for the choral Office, was restricted to a formula that did not suit it. There was not sufficient time given to allow for the development of a form suitable for private recitation.

There are several reasons why such an Office failed to develop. First, the Breviary reform of the 13th century was not the work of men who recited the Breviary privately, but was done by members of religious orders, and especially of the mendicant orders, whose life was centered, at least in spirit, around a communal recitation of the Breviary. The Breviary of Innocent III and of Nicholas III was derived from the Breviary of the Minims, and soon became the breviary of the Roman Church. In thus borrowing the office of the friars, the *Ordo Romanae Curiae* became essentially a choral Office for the use of clerics attached to the service of a fixed Church.

In the 16th century the emphasis of reform was directed at clerical life lived in common, especially through the formation of the orders of clerks regular. These groups were attached to the choral Office. It was the Theatines, for instance, who worked on the Breviary reform of Paul IV, and it was their work that issued in the decrees of St. Pius V. Only the Jesuits, among these orders, broke with tradition and opened the way to modern conceptions.

An Abortive Attempt

In 1527 Cardinal Quignonez was assigned to prepare a Breviary specially designed for private recitation. Leaving intact the choral Office, he strove to compose a new Office which he believed would be more in conformity with ancient tradition and more apt to serve the spiritual interests of priests bound to the private recitation. Approved by Paul III in 1535, the book was a grand success; it was praised on all sides, and it went through over a hundred editions before it was suppressed by Pius V in 1568. But because its principles were too radical and because it was too great a departure from the past, the Church chose to abandon and to delay her reform rather than to break so completely with her traditions.

A balance must be achieved between private praying and official public prayer, even if recited privately by nearly all priests. This can be done, and done discretely and with proper submission to authority. There can be no reason why the Office, which in the past has absorbed so many diverse elements, cannot now absorb and integrate private recitation. Certainly let the choral Office continue with full and undiminished fervor in the monastic and regular churches and in the European cathedrals and collegiate churches. But also let there be given to the priests who are absorbed by the works of the ministry, by mission work, by teaching, an Office suited to their work, yet still inspired by the whole background of the development of the Roman liturgy.

A *New* Breviary Not Required

It is not necessary for such reform to compose a new Breviary. It suffices to make a distinction between choral and private recitation; to permit a good number of choral parts to be omitted at option in private recitation; and to eliminate many of the complexities of the present system. To restore the emphasis to the temporal cycle; to reduce the number of feasts, by introducing the *memoria* for

many saints; to revise carefully and simplify historical passages; to make a new choice of scripture readings, sermons, and homilies; to eliminate the breaking up of the lessons into three sections,—these are some of the ways reform could be achieved. While still keeping traditional and essential elements, the Office would become not only a worthy one, but also a simple and fruitful one, full of tremendous spiritual value. Perhaps, too, freedom could be allowed, as formerly, for local variations, needs of particular churches and states of life, rather than the insistence on the material identity of the formulae.

But let us in all trust in the Church, knowing as we do that in this as in all other things she will not fail to consult the best interests of her sons and the needs of their souls.

RELATED ARTICLES ON BREVIARY REFORM

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TOPICAL INDEX VOL. I

The following index has been prepared as a substitute for a title index of the articles in THEOLOGY DIGEST. Since many of the titles are substitutions for titles originally in a foreign language, it was felt that a topical index would be of greater use to the readers of the DIGEST. The letters (D), (A), (B) designate digest, abstract, and bibliography.

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A Partial List of Journals Consulted in Selecting Articles for THEOLOGY DIGEST

AMERICAN BENEDICTINE REVIEW
Quarterly review of theology and other subjects published by the American Benedictine Academy, 528 High Street, Newark 2, New Jersey.

L'AMI DU CLERGÉ
Weekly review of theological questions edited and published by diocesan clergy of Langres; 4, rue Claude-Gillot, Langres (Hte-Marne), France.

BIBLICA
Quarterly studies in scriptural research edited and published by the Pontificio Instituto Biblico, Piazza Pilotta 35, Roma (204), Italy.

BLACKFRIARS
Monthly journal of theology edited by the Dominican Fathers of Oxford. Blackfriars Publications, 34 Bloomsbury Street, London W.C. 1, England.

BULLETIN DE LITTÉRATURE ECCLÉSIASTIQUE
Quarterly journal of theology edited and published by the Institut Catholique, 31, rue de la Fonderie, Toulouse, France.

BULLETIN THOMISTE
Annual review published by the Société Thomiste (France). Centre Annexe du Bulletin Thomiste; Institut d'Études Médiévales, 831 Avenue Rockland, Montréal 8, Canada.

CAHIERS LAENNEC
Quarterly journal of medico-moral questions published by P. Lethielleux; 10, rue Cassette, Paris (VI), France.

CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY
Quarterly journal of scriptural studies published by the Catholic Biblical Assn. of America; The Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

DIVUS THOMAS (Freiburg)
Quarterly journal of philosophy and theology edited by the Faculty of the Albertinum (Universitat Freiburg). Paulusverlag, Freiburg, Switzerland.

DOCTOR COMMUNIS
Review of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas (Rome) published three times a year. Casa Editrice Marietti, via Legnano, 23, Torino, Italy.

DOCUMENTATION CATHOLIQUE
Magazine appearing every 15 days containing various ecclesiastical documents of the Holy See, the French Hierarchy, etc. Maison de la Bonne Presse, 5, rue Bayard, Paris 8, France.

EPHEMERIDES MARIOLOGICAE
Quarterly journal of Mariology edited in Spain by the Claretian Fathers. Ephemerides Mariologicae, Buen Suceso, 22, Madrid, Spain.

ESTUDIOS ECLESIASTICOS
Quarterly review of theology edited by the Jesuit Fathers; published by Ediciones Fax, Zurbano 80, Madrid, Spain.

GEIST UND LEBEN
Bi-monthly journal of ascetical and mystical theology edited by the Jesuit Fathers of Munich. Echter-Verlag, Würzburg, Germany.

IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD
Monthly review of ecclesiastical studies edited at St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. Publisher: Browne & Nolan Ltd., 41 Nassau St., Dublin.

THE JURIST
Quarterly studies in Canon Law edited and published by the School of Canon Law, The Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

LITURGIA
Bi-monthly review of liturgy edited and published by the Benedictine Monks of the Abbey of Santo Domingo de Silos, Burgos, Spain.

MÉLANGES DE SCIENCE RELIGIEUSE
Semi-annual review of theology edited and published by the Professors of the Facultés Catholiques, 1, rue François-Baes, Lille, France.

MONTH
Monthly review edited by the Jesuit Fathers in London. Published by Longmans, Green & Co., 6 Clifford Street, London W. 1, England.

NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR MISSIONS-WISSENSCHAFT
NOUVELLE REVUE DE SCIENCE MISSIONNAIRE
Quarterly review of missiological thought edited by the Professors at Seminar Schoneck, Beckenried, Switzerland.

NOUVELLE REVUE THÉOLOGIQUE
Monthly review of theology edited by the Jesuits of the College S. Albert, Louvain; published by Etabl. Casterman, 28, rue des Soeurs Noires, Tournai, Belgium.

PERIODICA

Quarterly review of moral theology and Canon Law edited by the Professors of the Gregorian University, Rome. Piazza della Pilotta, 4, Rome, Italy.

RECHERCHES DE SCIENCE RELIGIEUSE

Quarterly journal of theology edited and published by the Jesuits of Paris; 15, rue Monsieur, Paris (VII), France.

RELATIONS

Monthly review of general coverage edited by the Jesuit Fathers in Canada. 8100, Boul. Saint-Laurent, Montréal 14, Canada.

REVISTA DE ESPIRITUALIDAD

Quarterly review of ascetical theology edited and published in Spain by the Discalced Carmelite Fathers, Plaza de Espana, Madrid, Spain.

REVUE BIBLIQUE

Quarterly published under the direction of the École Pratique d'Études Bibliques (Jerusalem). Cabalda et Cie., rue Bonaparte 90, Paris, France.

REVUE D'ASCETIQUE ET DE MYSTIQUE

Quarterly review of ascetical and mystical theology edited and published by the Jesuits of Toulouse; 9, rue Monplaisir, Toulouse, France.

REVUE D'HISTOIRE ECCLÉSIASTIQUE

Quarterly review of Ecclesiastical History published by the University of Louvain. Bibliotheque de l'Université, Place Mgr. Ladeuze, Louvain, Belgium.

REVUE DIOCÉSAINE DE NAMUR

Bi-monthly review of theology edited by the diocesan clergy of Namur. Published by J. Duculot, S.A., Gembloux, Belgium.

REVUE DIOCÉSAINE DE TOURNAI

Bi-monthly review of theology edited by the diocesan clergy of Tournai, 28, rue des Jésuites, Tournai, Belgium.

REVUE DES SCIENCES PHILOSOPHIQUES ET THÉOLOGIQUES

Quarterly of philosophy and theology published by the Dominican Fathers of the Faculties of Philosophy and Theology at Le Saulchoir. Librairie Vrin, 6, place de la Sorbonne, Paris (V) France.

REVUE DES SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES

Quarterly review of theology edited and published at Palais Universitaire, Strasbourg (Bas-Rhin), France.

SCHOLASTIK

Quarterly review of philosophy and theology edited and published by the Jesuit Fathers in Germany. Offenbacher Landstr. 224, Frankfurt a. M. Süd 10, Germany.

SCRIPTURE

Quarterly journal of the Catholic Biblical Association (England); 141a Kensington High Street, London W. 8, England.

STIMMEN DER ZEIT

Monthly review of theology and other subjects edited by the Jesuit Fathers in Germany. Herder & Co., Johannierstrasze 4, Freiburg i. Br., Germany.

THEOLOGIE UND GLAUBE

Bi-monthly journal of theolgy edited by professors at seminary of Paderborn; published by Verlag Schoningh, Paderborn, Germany.

THE THOMIST

Quarterly review of philosophy and theology edited by the Dominican Fathers, 487 Michigan Ave. N. E., Washington 17, D. C.

THOUGHT

Quarterly journal of scholarly research and writing published at Fordham University, New York. Graduate School, Fordham University, New York 58, N. Y.

UNITAS

Quarterly review of the Unitas Association for the promotion of reunion of the schismatical churches with Rome. English language edition: The Graymoor Press, Peekskill, N. Y.

VERBUM DOMINI

Review of scriptural studies edited bi-monthly by the Pontificio Istituto Biblico, Via Pilotta 24, Rome (204), Italy.

VIE SPIRITUELLE

Monthly journal of spirituality edited by the Dominican Fathers; published by Editions du Cerf, 29, Boul. de Latour-Maubourg, Paris (VII), France.

WORLD MISSION

Quarterly review of missiology published by the National Office of the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, 109 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

Names and addresses of journals having digests or abstracts in this issue have been included above although they may have appeared in the last issue. This list will be continued in subsequent issues of THEOLOGY DIGEST.